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Passageways of Cooperation: Mutual Help in Post-Socialist Tanzania* 
By Daivi Rodima-Taylor 
 
Associational Plurality and Novel Public Spaces in Africa 
Idioms and vocabularies of sharing and cooperation pervade the associational environment of 
informal mutual help groups in Kuria communities of northwest Tanzania. Different types of 
cash contribution and cooperative work groups proliferate in local villages, towns, and 
marketplaces, merging old and new types of resources and patterns of reciprocities. The 
groups  give rise to new categories of peers who associate through new types of activities and 
provide novel opportunities for empowerment and self-realization but also present the 
potential for new inequalities. Combining the rhetoric of cooperation and sharing with 
emerging avenues for individual advancement, the groups facilitate new types of value 
conversions and novel moral discourses in commercializing local communities. The tension 
between individualist and collectivist values that is essential to the operation of the new 
associational activities raises questions about their impact on broader social solidarities and 
emerging public spaces in post-socialist Tanzania.  
There has been a significant increase in informal associations in Africa over the past 
few decades. Economic liberalization and political decentralization have contributed to the 
rapid expansion of the associational environment, with public spaces increasingly 
reconfigured through “a new generation of collective organizations around informal 
livelihood issues” (Lindell 2010: 8). The emerging associations are increasingly 
heterogenous and multiclass, comprising diverse age, gender, and ethnic categories (ibid.). 
This “flowering of popular associations among informal actors” brings more room for 
collective agency and political expression (Meagher 2010: 46), and fosters new divisions and 
alternative social spaces. It is effecting a massive transformation of occupational identities, 
with important consequences to social trust and public morality (Bryceson 2010). The 
“experimental diversification” with new livelihood activities in insecure environments has 
encouraged new skills and associational ties, incorporating diverse categories of participants 
(ibid., 12). Local institutions of mutual assistance are therefore becoming increasingly 
important in regulating access to resources and redefining patterns of association in African 
communities.  
Voluntary associations in older and more modern forms abound in African 
communities, but their impacts on civic spaces are far from evident. Haphazardly imposed 
external institutions and knowledge practices compound the spurious and localized nature of 
public authority in Africa. Such composite and parallel sites of authority and association can 
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result in an emerging “twilight zone” between public and private, formal and informal (Lund 
2006). Attention to these various “intermediate solidarities” is vital for understanding the 
local reproduction of persons and their associational environment (Englund 2004: 3). The 
intensifying global flows of capital and information are transforming local conceptualizations 
of property and person, accelerating mixed and contradictory proprietory forms and 
commoditized notions of identity and personhood (Maurer and Schwab 2006). The laterally 
expanding hybrid property models that accompany global processes of privatization and 
deregulation also redefine the relationships between public and private, individual and 
community (Ibid.). Public spaces for negotiation of novel property relations and social 
identities are becoming more restricted and confined, but also more multi-sited and plural. 
This informal associational plurality that is often particularly pronounced in post-socialist 
and post-authoritarian contexts has also renewed academic and development policy debates 
over the concept of civil society (see also Hann 1996; Ferguson 2006; Wedel 1992).  
As Ferguson (2006: 78) points out, the Hegelian conceptualization of civil society as 
an intermediary space between the universality of the state and particularity of the family can 
obscure the discussion of African politics by legitimating a “vertical power topography” and 
the universalizing claims of the state. Arguing against an exaggerated public-private 
dichotomy, Ferguson suggests a deeper ethnographic focus on locally mediating diverse 
arrangements and practices. Comaroff and Comaroff (1999a: 23-25) similarly warn against 
ideal-type universals and oppositions when evaluating the plurality of associational modes in 
African communities, arguing that the political power of that social space lay in “its very 
incoherence, its polysemy, its slippery opacity.” “Few have considered the sorts of public 
sphere presumed by specifically African relations of production and exchange, codes of 
conduct, or styles of social intercourse; by African markets, credit associations, informal 
economies, collective ritual, modes of aesthetic expression, discourses of magic and reason; 
by the various strands, in other words, that “weave the fabric” of the civil here beyond the 
official purview of governance.”  
Instead of normative evaluations of civil society as a sphere of solidarity or a site of 
resistance, Tostensen, Tvedten, and Vaa (2001: 13), call for a more locally contextualized 
approach in order to capture “the multitude of organizational forms and expressions as 
ambiguous and contradictory in value terms.” To help illuminate the dynamics of emerging 
civil society organizations, particularly in post-socialist and other transitional contexts, Hann 
(1996: 22) advises deeper attention to various types of reciprocal associations and mutual aid 
networks that enable one to explore the new spaces “in the context of the ideas and practices 
through which cooperation and trust are established in social life.”  
The need to reach beyond rigid conceptual oppositions also applies to the concept of 
“informal economy” that is often used in reference to the novel collective activities. The 
sphere of informal economy, often variously viewed as a device for self-employment or a site 
of subversion and resistance, is based on a conceptualization of self-organized popular 
economies as uncontrolled by the national bureaucracy (Hart 2010: 143; see also Hann and 
Hart 2011). Hart (2010: 149) argues however that instead of focusing on the informal/formal 
dualism, more attention should be on the multiple institutions and practices that are entailed 
in their dialectical interaction. Lindell (2010: 5) similarly instructs us to view informality 
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foremost as a “category of practice,” necessitating attention to its regulation “through a 
multiplicity of rules, institutions and a variety of actors beyond the state.” Calling attention to 
the co-production of different forms of financial management in people’s everyday 
experience and moral discourses in the popular economies of Africa, Hull and James (2012: 
2) show how “[f]ormalization and informalization … occur in continual interaction with each 
other, producing a plurality.” This interface of formality and informality in Africa is 
increasingly influenced by two somewhat contradictory processes—an increasing 
financialization of the world economies, expressed in the expansion of the financial sector 
and focus on private investment, and a widespread informalization that started with 
neoliberal deregulation reforms and has increasingly liberated the movement of capital from 
state controls (4-5). The attempts to incorporate more people into formal financial structures 
through various financial inclusion policies are therefore occurring in the conditions of 
contracting formal sector in many African countries. That calls attention to local creative 
modes and strategies of coping and innovation under increasingly unstable conditions. As 
Hull and James point out, the hybrid character of the new economic activities and attitudes 
that draws upon local diversity and inventiveness, and the community-based strategies of 
cooperation and innovation are essential to the emerging popular economies. 
The study of informality therefore entails attention to a multiplicity of new and old 
resources, diverse normative frameworks, and expanding categories of actors. Informal 
economic associations combine increasingly diverse resources and social purposes, 
integrating local patterns of labor management with those of financial management.1 Many 
recent studies on African mutual help have demonstrated that indigenous financial 
management institutions are intricately embedded in local social organization and cultural 
patterns of cooperation. The literature also reflects changing assumptions about the 
developmental trajectory of mutual help. A few earlier ethnographic reports have tended to 
view indigenous credit associations as transitional formations leading towards a more 
commercialized economy: as a “middle rung in development” between the formal and 
informal sectors that is ultimately “self-liquidating, being replaced … by banks, cooperatives, 
                                                 
1 That integrative aspect of indigenous debt regulation often has not been understood or captured by 
prevailing development interventions. Claiming its foundations in social networks of cooperation and trust, 
microfinance has been increasingly criticized for neglecting to investigate the deeper social meanings of debt: 
“the symbols and layers of what is going on behind the mere transaction” (Dichter 2007: 13). The artificial 
social space of “microinformality” that often emerges from ill-conceived development policy initiatives 
(Elyachar 2002: 497) can distort the representations of existing mutual help and debt networks in local 
communities. By basing its tenets on an under-analyzed concept of social capital, the formal discourse of 
microfinance is frequently governed by “moralizing statements” about the nature of community networks 
(Smets and Baehre 2004: 217). Shipton (2007:10) argues that development interventions need to look beyond 
the formal aspects of credit, debt, and economic self-interest, in order to include “various kinds of indigenous 
and imported practices” of entrustment and obligation. Practical as well as moral attributes of entrustment are 
important to illuminate the complex individual and collective dimensions that lie behind the transfers (Shipton 
2007 11–12).  
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and economically more rational types of credit institutions” (Geertz 1962: 263). Rapid 
Western-style commercialization was also assumed to affect other resources pooled through 
mutual help networks.  
Erasmus (1956) claimed that wage labor was rapidly replacing “older,” reciprocal 
forms of farm labor. Uchendu (1970) suggested that indigenous cooperative labor initiatives 
were declining with the increasing monetization and specialization of African local 
economies. Many recent studies indicate, however, that contemporary work groups are 
proliferating more widely than ever, integrating contractual as well as multi-stranded 
elements and various different resources, including money and labor (Worby 1995; 
Geschiere 1995; Den Ouden 1995; Englund 1999; McAllister 1999). Instead of becoming 
single-purpose, the multiplicity of activities and functions has become a defining element of 
many of the groups. For example, Ardener (1995; 2010) argues that the multipurpose 
character of the informal savings groups is important for their viability. The groups provide 
social insurance and access to information and markets; economic gains can be minimal. As 
everyday activities and commonalities are often more important than kin ties in recruiting 
new members, the groups can act to negotiate difference outside the ascribed social hierarchy 
(Mwaniki 1986; Harkness and Super 2002). The activities of the novel informal associations 
can therefore lead to the establishment of alternative social spaces for negotiating obligations 
and resource rights. 
African economies have historically been characterized by a diversification of activity 
profiles and ties of reciprocity, related to long-term patterns of social and economic 
instabilities (Guyer 1995a, b; Berry 1995). The novel opportunities and discourses created by 
the money economy have further expanded the institutional diversity: “monetization has 
often been accompanied by the preservation or even multiplication of local institutions for 
obtaining credit or managing savings” (Berry 1995: 309). To capture the continuities in the 
past and present forms of local modes of financial management, Guyer and Stiansen (1999: 
3) have suggested attention should be given to long-term regulatory frameworks and their 
relationships to local religious ideas and cosmologies. Instead of viewing mutual help groups 
in African communities as embodiments of assumed communalist values or as Western-type 
money management instruments, attention is called to the circulation of resources and 
regulation of reciprocities that the groups facilitate.  
This paper will examine the patterns and discourses of sharing and cooperation as 
well as broader moralities and freedoms that are reproduced in Kuria mutual help groups. It 
is based on 32 months of ethnographic field research in Tarime and Serengeti districts of 
Mara region that investigated local patterns of cooperation and the emerging modes of 
personhood within the novel associational environments.2 The study argues that the systemic 
                                                 
2 The main part of the research took place between 1999 and 2002 in six villages of Tarime and three 
villages of Serengeti districts. It included longitudinal participant observation and informal interviews, formal 
and semi-formal surveys and questionnaires, communication with economic group members and local farmers, 
informal councils and state courts, local and central government authorities, non-governmental organizations 
and development programs at local and national scales. The research also benefited from historical records at 
the Tanzanian National Archives, research collections at the libraries of the University of Dar es Salaam, 
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dynamic of Kuria cooperative groups should not be sought in the additive accumulation of 
material wealth or undisputed reproduction of social solidarity, but rather in historically 
defined processes of extending one’s self through social ties of interdependence. Such 
relational dynamics of informality also illuminate the emerging public spaces and socialities 
in globalizing Tanzanian communities. The paper is structured to provide an overview of 
different forms of Kuria cooperation in historical as well as contemporary perspectives, and 
situate these in a broader framework of culturally relevant exchanges and moralities. The first 
part of the study discusses the social organization of Kuria mutual help, analyzing its 
connections with descent and age organization and other variables relevant for its 
mobilization. It explores transformations in local mutual help forms and discusses the 
dynamics of contemporary Kuria work and savings groups that proliferate in 
commercializing local communities. Tendencies toward greater formalization of work 
reciprocities and the emergence of new categories of peers are explored. The evolution of 
Kuria mutual help is placed in the context of comparative ethnographic evidence of recent 
transformations of collective work in Africa. The second part of the study examines the 
construction of Kuria persons through public collective activities, situating these within the 
transformed materiality of socially significant exchanges and transfers. Socially relevant 
forms of savings and accumulation that affect mutuality and their historical transformations 
are explored. Changes in gendered savings and work profiles are also discussed. The study 
also examines novel forms of cooperation in community peacekeeping, revealing Kuria 
vigilantism as another important associational area of the local informality.  
Kuria Mutual Help: Past and Present 
Cooperation and Self-Reliance in Socialist Tanzania 
The history of mutual help institutions in Tanzania reveals a story of persistent change in the 
face of political and economic instabilities. It also testifies to a remarkable continuity 
resulting from a constant recombining of institutional and conceptual repertoires. The 
concepts of “sharing” and “working together” have been used to legitimize coercive state 
reforms but have also facilitated the emergence of novel peer work groups. These concepts 
have been instrumental in nation-building in postcolonial Tanzania. President Nyerere’s 
ideology of Ujamaa or Tanzanian socialism was inspired by an idealized vision of a 
“traditional” African village commune: “In Nyerere’s theory there would be a socialist nation 
when the whole nation had been organized on the basis of ujamaa villages where people 
lived together as was the case in traditional Africa. … people would share labor returns 
equally, would respect each other and would provide security for each other.” (Maghimbi 
1995: 28). The underlying assumption of the Tanzanian Ujamaa ideology was that the 
precolonial Africa “contained socialist features which have been partially lost as a result of 
                                                                                                                                                       
Institute of Development Studies and Institute of Resource Assessment at UDSM, as well as interviews and 
research at the Tanzanian Women’s Research Center, Tanzanian National Bank, and Ukiriguru Agricultural 
Research Institute. The research was funded by grants from the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological 
Research, Sigma Xi Foundation, and the Sachar Award of Brandeis University.  
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the colonial intervention” (Mapulo 1973: 8), and that these can be reinstated, given the right 
policy measures. These ideas of traditional cooperation are reflected in the socialist concept 
of Ujamaa, which entailed a voluntary collective village enterprise with joint distribution of 
the proceeds and a village fund for savings and investments (Abrahams 1985: 9). However, 
neither village-based settlements nor communal production as conceptualized in the Ujamaa 
ideology had a precedence in Tanzanian social reality: “The absence of indigenous social 
forms that corresponded to this utopia of collaboration … meant that such apparently 
traditional forms had to be created by the state through the category of the village as the 
naturally self-contained unit of production, consumption, and governance” (Green 2010: 23).  
Metaphors based on family and kinship pervaded the socialist developmental 
discourse. The Ujamaa Villagization policy was supposed to reactivate “the principles upon 
which the traditional extended family was based” (Nyerere 1968: 340). These assumed 
primordial principles of kinship and sharing informed socialist concepts like “Ujamaa” 
(which in direct translation means “family ties” or “brotherhood,” but came to indicate 
Tanzanian socialism and cooperation in the communal villages) as well as “kujitoelea” or 
“self-reliance” that denoted participation in the communal development projects of the state. 
Self-help initiatives in Tanzania were not an entirely new policy instrument; colonial 
administrations had sporadically relied on them for infrastructure repairs. However, during 
the socialist period a sharp rise occurred in ideologically conceived and centrally 
administered community self-help projects.  
Citizenship in the newly independent Tanzania implied one’s active participation in 
national development projects, defined mostly by duties rather than rights of an individual 
(Jennings 2007). The concept of self-reliance (kujitoelea), the main figure of speech in the 
socialist rhetoric, became associated with forced labor and purposeless government work 
(Caplan 1993). Because of the widespread shortage of government revenue, self-reliance 
often meant that “lower tiers of administration had to provide their own resources for 
conforming to the project of national development” (Green 2010: 24). The extent of state 
intrusion in the lives of its citizens was significant: “Depending on the most recent national 
policy directive, local party officials were in a position to influence people’s actions over a 
wide behavioural spectrum, including where to live (villagization), what not to wear 
(indecent dress campaign), where and how to farm (block farm extension), and where not to 
shop (Operation Maduka involving the closure of private shops)” (Bryceson 1993: 14). It 
soon became clear however, that the concept of socialist self-help as a national policy failed 
to work as expected.  
Several years after the start of the Villagization initiative, only a fraction of the 
country’s population had joined collectivized cultivation. Forceful resettlement operations 
were launched in various areas of Tanzania in 1973. According to Abrahams (1985), the 
official corporate existence of the Ujamaa villages served to reinforce the gap between the 
interests of the villages as administrative and ideological actors and the people living in them 
who were subjected to increasing control by the state. The imposition of socialist universal-
membership organizations (party organizations, cooperative villages) upon the already 
existing kin and lineage-based structures of political organization only exacerbated the 
political fragmentation and proliferation of informal networks in socialist Tanzania (see also 
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Moore 1986).3 Scott (1998: 238) has described the effects of the state initiatives of 
communal resettlement and production as follows: “the modern planned village in Tanzania 
was essentially a point-by-point negation of existing rural practice, which included shifting 
cultivation and pastorialism; polycropping; living well off the main roads; kinship and 
lineage authority; small, scattered settlements with houses built higgledy-piggledy; and 
production that was dispersed and opaque to the state”. Ignoring the existing patterns of 
social organization of rural production and resource management, the doomed village 
communal production effort was abandoned soon after 1976.  
Paradoxically perhaps, the period of Ujamaa Villagization also witnessed an 
unprecedented rise in regular economic associations between people not related by kin. This 
was especially true for women and youth, who were in social categories especially 
marginalized by compulsory villagization. Women’s workloads had doubled and they had 
lost their customary landholding rights (Caplan 1993; Putterman 1995). Men gained social 
status by being politically active in the new administrative structures while women were 
relegated to subsistence production (McHenry 1982). Novel types of women’s associations 
emerged all around the country, fostering social alliances of women in the new villages. 
Further impetus to the proliferation of informal associations came from growing economic 
instabilities resulting from multiple factors like the oil crisis of the 1970s and the decline in 
agricultural markets worldwide, urbanization, and the African debt crisis with the subsequent 
Structural Adjustment Reforms of the 1980s (Bryceson 2010: 9). That set off “a long-term 
process of deagrarianization that involved occupational adjustment, income-earning 
reorientation, social re-identification and spatial relocation of rural dwellers away from 
agricultural-based modes of livelihood” (Bryceson 2010: 9).  
The economic crisis of the 1980s–1990s further reduced salary levels and undermined 
formal sector employment in Tanzania, resulting in an unprecedented growth in informal 
economic groups and mutual aid societies (Seppala 2010). These included rotating savings 
and credit schemes (upatu), burial societies, economic groups for handicrafts, street catering 
enterprises (mama ntilie), retail shops, and informal associations for traders and market 
women (Mbilinyi 1999; Koda 1996; Tripp 1994; Omari 1996; Swantz and Tripp 1996; 
Lugalla 1997).  
Kuria Mutual Help: Historical Perspectives 
Informal associations were also proliferating among Kuria people of Mara region at the time 
of my field study. In the 1970s and 80s, profound changes had taken place in Kuria society, 
including massive villagization resettlement and the imposition of socialist state structures, 
                                                 
3 Moore has argued that the new cooperative villages and socialist administrative structures among the 
Chagga of Kilimanjaro discouraged political alliances and cohesion on larger levels. The continued 
predominance of universal membership organizations in local political life resulted in greater internal 
complexity that remained unmarked by formal divisions, facilitating “segmentary” rather than “organic” social 
organization in local communities (Moore 1986: 316).  
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growing environmental instabilities involving periodic droughts and floods,4 economic out-
migration to Serengeti lowlands and neighboring Mara region, and increasingly violent cattle 
rustling.5 A look at some relevant features of Kuria social organization and political authority 
helps to explain the evolvement of Kuria mutual help arrangements. The Kuria are Bantu-
speaking semi-pastoralists who occupy hilly grasslands on the shores of Lake Victoria, on 
both sides of the Tanzania-Kenya border.  
 The Kuria agropastoral system has historically been characterized by a diversity of 
livelihood activities and modes of association in order to effectively utilize its diverse 
microenvironments.6 The clan (ikiaro) was the main unit of political organization of the 
tribe, and was associated with a hypothesized common descent (symbolized by a totemic 
animal) and was active in military defense. The clan consisted of a variety of concentrated 
hilltop settlements (irigori) (Ruel 1959; Cory 1947). The inhabitants of the irigori cooperated 
in various subsistence activities.7 Clans were further divided into a descent section (egesaku), 
                                                 
4 Chronic water scarcity and increased variability in the flow of water had affected the downstream areas 
of Mara River Sub-Basin, particularly affecting communities on the Tanzanian side. With a severe decrease in 
wetlands, water supply in local water sources was becoming seasonal, affecting local food security and causing 
a rise in conflicts over water and other natural resource access at the levels of households as well as livelihood 
systems.  Severe climate related shocks of the recent past included the heavy rainfall and flooding caused by El-
Nino-related climate events of 1997–98. The events had resulted in severe damage to road and water 
infrastructure and agricultural crops in several areas of Mara region, causing erosion of fields and pastures and 
impairing access to local markets.  
5 During the colonial period up to 1961, Kuria communities in Tanganyika remained relatively isolated, 
with minimal integration into the political or economic structures of the colonial state (Nielsen 2002, Koponen 
1994). Differently from some of the neighboring ethnic groups, Kuria had not participated in long-distance 
trade networks. The early colonial administrations in Kurialand had been fairly unsuccessful in introducing 
commercial agriculture and money-based trade and taxation in the region. To some extent, money entered the 
local communities during and after the Second World War (largely due to the involvement of Kuria men in the 
armed forces as well as occasional work in the mines). 
6 Historical tendencies towards a diversification of resource use and income strategies have also been 
noted among ethnically related neighboring tribes. Shetler (2007: 66–70) has described how oral traditions and 
other evidence testify to the ways in which people of western Serengeti routinely diversified their subsistence 
strategies in order to “spread risk rather than concentrate wealth”. Farmers used the ties of kinship and 
friendship to gain access to multiple microenvironments through strategies like spreading out fields for 
agricultural cultivation, practicing various forms of cattle trusteeship, periodically moving their homesteads, 
and utilizing the networks of kin and neighborhood for labor mobilization: “Descent systems, agricultural 
practices, settlement patterns, use of wilderness resources, and systems of land tenure illustrate the ways in 
which people used the land extensively rather than intensively” (Shelter 2007: 66). 
7 The traditional dispersed hilltop settlements were destroyed in many Kuria areas as a result of the 
Villagization reforms of early 1970s. Many newly established villages accommodated people from different 
geographic areas and ethnic groups, suffering from overpopulation, lack of resources, and loss of customary 
land rights (see also Tobisson 1986 and Matango 1975).  
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clan segment (irigiha), and lineage or family (eeka), instrumental in coordinating fighting 
duties and cattle raiding as well as regulating kinship relations.8 All of these social units had 
some role in mutual help mobilization, but it is interesting to note that collective labor was 
frequently also drawn from larger units of common descent like clan segments, or even 
several of these at a time, reinforcing diffuse ties and memberships of mutual help in the 
community: “Often work groups are said to have been drawn from two or more clan 
segments forming an intermediate group between them and the minor descent sections. The 
descent groups drawn upon for such work groups were not always fixed, however, and 
according to the amount of work to be done ranged (in buTimbaru) from a minor clan 
segment to a major descent section” (Ruel 1959: 41). 
The segmentary Kuria clans had no formal institutions for maintaining political order, 
which was mainly shaped through discussions and public opinion (Ruel 1962; 1959). The 
moral community of the clan was conditioned by communal rites and the secret council of 
prophets and seers, inchama. The diversity of the descent units as well as elements of age 
organization served to increase the variety of interactional contexts in Kuria society that were 
used for mutual help mobilization. As notes Rwezaura (1985: 18): “The age grade 
organization, which … cuts across kinship lines, provides a second framework for the 
organization of agricultural work, particularly through work teams.” Cross-cutting 
solidarities were created by age-related affiliations like age-grades, generation classes and 
circumcision sets. Generation classes (irikora) determined the status of an individual in the 
clan in relation to others along the lines of generational separation and alignment, ascribing 
norms of familiarity and reserve (Ruel 1959). By prescribing classificatory membership for 
clan members and regulating rules of marriage and intimacy, they created a basis for diffuse 
solidarity within the main units of social organization. Other local age-related organizations 
included age-grades, constituted by a person’s status based on age and rites of passages; and 
circumcision sets (esaaro)—groups of initiates circumcised at the same ceremony (Ruel 
1959: 118). According to Ruel, the capacities of generation classes and circumcision sets to 
mobilize collective action were quite different—whereas people of the same generation class 
engaged in collective activities relatively occasionally, circumcision sets had more 
corporality and acted collectively in a wider set of circumstances. The age-grade system 
traditionally gave rise to the organization of youth work groups, which often began as early 
as around ten years of age. The young remained members of the cooperative group until their 
circumcision (18–25 years of age for men and 15–20 for women). Each group had its leader 
                                                 
8 The function of the descent section was generalized and mostly political, associated with fighting duties. 
The exogamous clan segment, the next unit, was based on common agnatic kinship and served as a basis for 
generalized obligation of mutual help, frequently mobilized for cattle debt and homicide payments. Lineages, 
on the other hand, were more immediate groupings related to the history of common descent—they comprised 
the male descendants of a common ancestor whose connections were traced through series of named links (Ruel 
1959: 40). The relationships of the individuals of this unit were more personal in nature, and concerned with 
property and inheritance matters as well as local ritual activities of the descent group. 
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(umunene) who was the eldest boy and the first to be circumcised. Cory describes the 
operation of the esaiga9 as follows:  
The children worked in turn, corporatively, in the fields of their fathers. They helped 
also fathers with small children or without children, but these fathers had to make 
them presents for their work, usually a goat, which was slaughtered and consumed at 
a common meal of a Saiga to which the female members had to bring the ugali. Boys 
and girls worked together and such a working group was called a kisasi or mugambo. 
They had also their common dances in which strict conventions were observed (Cory 
1945: Appendix III, subdivision 2).  
The joint activities had a function of socializing the youth, serving as a safeguard of public 
morality: “The girls were much afraid to become pregnant before circumcision because the 
punishment was very severe. A pregnant girl was expelled from the community and had to 
leave the district” (ibid.). The uncircumcised youngster10 had the social permission to 
participate in a variety of work groups, as Seba accounts: 
In the traditional Kuria society, abarisya (plural) join in the mutual work teams of 
their respective villages, the first level at which these youths become exposed to 
higher organs of co-operation in the community. Of the existing mutual work teams 
abarisya can enter: Irimuga, Irika, Ekegegi, Egesangero, and even Isiri all of which 
are engaged in productive work. However, he is barred from doing a lot more things 
which his elders do11 (Seba 1979: 3). 
Circumcision sets had an important ritual role and aided in establishing a collective 
sentiment among the initiates through public celebrations and recitals of praise poems. As 
compared to generation classes, their social context was more immediate and individualized: 
“Generational belonging is genealogically prescribed, whereas a circumcision-set is 
composed of individuals, men and women, who have undergone circumcision together” 
(Tobisson 1986: 113). However, circumcision sets did not form collectivities for regular 
community labor or mutual help mobilization.12 Perhaps for this reason, the multiple 
                                                 
9 The word esaiga is used here in the meaning of pre-circumcision age set. 
10 The Kuria person goes through the following stages of life: umurisya (uncircumcised boy), umumura 
(adult warrior who has passed the circumcision ceremony), omogaaka (elder whose firstborn has been 
circumcised), and umusubi (“celebrated elder” undergone certain maturity rituals) for men, and omosagane 
(uncircumcised girl), umuiseke (circumcised woman), umusubati (married woman who has given birth), 
umukungu (elder whose firstborn has been circumcised), and umusubi (“celebrated elder” who has undergone 
certain maturity rituals) for women. (See also Seba 1979, Bernhardsdotter 2001, and Ruel 1997). 
11 Some of those things included sharing jokes with the circumcised members of his work team, fighting 
with circumcised people, participating in cattle raiding parties, engaging in sexual intercourse, and holding 
property (Seba 1979).  
12 As Ruel notes: “In any case the period of most intensive collective activity for members of a set is 
immediately before and after circumcision. In the years following this, common meetings are less frequent, the 
interests of its members being directed rather to their own homes and families. A meeting of the set (e.g., to 
bring a case against a fellow member or to help a member in his farm work) can, however, still be called if 
Mutual Help in Post-Socialist Tanzania     11 
 
attempts by colonial as well as the independence era socialist state authorities to use 
traditional age organization for conscripting labor for public work projects have generally 
met with failure (see also Anacleti 1975; Koponen 1994).13 
Recent changes in Kuria society have caused transformations in the collectivities used 
for mobilizing and organizing mutual help. Partly resulting from growing population 
densities and the replacement of hilltop settlements with evenly spread homestead units, 
there has been a rise of “neighborhood units” (orobere) the members of which share diffuse 
ties of mutual help (Ruel 1959). That has somewhat reduced the importance of age grade and 
descent group solidarities. Cattle-raiding has been transformed from a socially regulated and 
community-oriented institution into a violent and commercial activity with international 
crime connections (Fleisher 2000). Men’s collective activities have become more 
neighborhood-based in contrast to the descent and community orientation of the past. Men 
have also seen a rise in work group activities, and many participate in informal neighborhood 
councils (iritongo) and their armed vigilante units. To a certain extent, however, traditional 
cross-cutting ties continue to mobilize collective action. Groups of youth formed on the basis 
of circumcision sets can participate in cattle rustling and marauding activities (see also Ruel 
2000; Fleisher 2000).  
Ethnographic evidence from earlier periods has confirmed the existence of various 
mutual help associations not only among Kuria, but also several neighboring peoples. These 
include the elika groups of Sukuma, and various similar reciprocal labor groups in the areas 
of Western Serengeti.14 Shipton (2007: 108) has described the farm labor exchange system 
                                                                                                                                                       
occasion warrants it at any time during the set’s life, and throughout their lives members are expected to uphold 
the solidarity of the set” (Ruel 1959: 128). 
13 Occasional attempts to engage Kuria age organizations in various community development activities 
have been made by state authorities at different times. In 1963, two years after Tanzanian independence, a 
report from a North Mara Community Development Officer to the Commissioner of Community Development 
discussed the potentials of Kuria age organizations for community development and self-help activities. The 
report is optimistic about the potential of North Mara age organizations: “The Area Commissioner and members 
of our staff agree that by strengthening and encouraging these traditional organizations a lot of community 
development activities can be accomplished. One interesting factor about these organizations is that everyone is 
a member of one group or another, for it is based on age-groupings. And these are mainly found among the 
Kuria-speaking people. The relationship between each group is one of harmony and respect for each other” 
(Subdivision I, point C). The report also notes the potential importance of these “traditional organizations” to 
the ongoing literacy campaign in Tanzania: “I am of the opinion that it is only through the local traditional age 
organizations, that the desire to become literate can be effectively aroused and maintained. Both the area 
commissioner and the C.D.A. [Community Development Authority] agreed that something should be done to 
revive these organizations as, due to lack of recognition and through fear of being victimized, many of them had 
gone underground or just pettered out.… The prospects for the success of the literacy campaign are indeed very 
bright” (Subdivision II, point 2). From “Report of Community Development Work in North Mara,” 16 th October 
1963, by S.N. Mkesso, Community Development Officer (Archival record D.3/6, Tanzania National Archives). 
14 Shetler recounts the following testimony from Western Serengeti: “In Ngoreme women remember 
reciprocal labor groups called chesiri that worked in each member’s fields in rotation for a set number of days, 
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rika among the Kenyan Luo as follows: “Between about three and eight people, most often 
women, spend their mornings together at a busy time of year, and working alone or perhaps 
in different groups at other times of days and times of year. The group may endure for more 
than one growing season”.  
In his 1959 fieldwork report Ruel (1959: 24) argues that work groups have always 
been of great importance in Kuria economy, with people regularly uniting “into an extensive 
system of reciprocal exchange of work according to the task in hand”. He observes that work 
groups were mostly formed at the times when the work was heaviest, especially at weeding 
and harvesting, but they could be arranged for virtually any type of work, and for both 
occasional and regular tasks (including plowing, land mounding, house building, 
constructing granaries and cattle corrals). Rwezaura (1985: 21) writes about Kuria traditional 
labor mobilization: “Most agricultural production was undertaken with the help of work-
parties. These work teams were very useful when weeding and harvesting required a larger 
labor force. Such work teams often did other types of work such as house building and fence 
making. Normally, the type of work depended on the membership of these teams. For 
example, a team of a circumcision set, usually drawn from the neighborhood, did other jobs 
such as hunting wild pigs or protecting the herds. They also cultivated the fields of the 
members or others on invitation”. 
Ruel (1959) differentiates “reciprocating” work groups (egosori, irika, egesangero, 
isiri) and “occasional” ones (irisaga and igikinga). The latter were convened for labor-
intensive tasks, with food and beer offered as compensation. Matango’s (1976) description of 
Kuria work groups is quite similar and includes two major subtypes: mutual aid teams 
organized on a yearly basis, and on ad hoc, day-to-day basis. Matango adds a couple of 
smaller work group types, like an ad hoc arrangement isigisi (ekebotoro)—described as part 
of one of the semi-permanent groups who form an emergency team to assist their group 
member outside his or her rotation (usually with farm work). That may indicate that certain 
aspects of regularization of group reciprocities were occurring already in the 1970s. 
Contemporary Forms of Collective Work among Kuria 
In general, many past Kuria mutual aid groups were mobilized less regularly and operated as 
parts of larger social networks based on kin, descent or age organization. In contrast, the 
present-day Kuria work groups (the main subtypes of which are iriika, isiiri, ikomiti and 
ekesangero) are more permanent, with a more clearly defined structure and by-laws. The 
groups engage in regular agricultural activities that include rotating farm labor and in some 
cases, group farming. They are increasingly active in non-agricultural ventures like brick 
                                                                                                                                                       
helped members bring home building materials, like thatch, or came together to grind grain. Each group had a 
leader who organized meetings and kept order. The group amused itself while it worked by singing songs that 
exposed the misdeeds of community members. Ikoma women’s work groups (kyama) worked one day in each 
woman’s field, moving together in a line and signing as someone led with the rhythm of a shaken gourd. A man 
might also call his neighbors to help him weed a field, cut poles, or gather thatch; in return he gave a beer party 
(risaga) to the fathers of the young men who worked, since in the past only the elders were allowed to drink 
beer” (2007: 75).  
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making, carpentry, local handicrafts and tailoring, street retail, and market trade. Group 
members may operate a joint business (workshop, retail store, or group farm). Group 
activities involve various rotating credit arrangements and often there is a group fund for 
emergency assistance and joint investments.  
 Another important function is “selling” group work-days to outsiders. Many group 
members are involved in individual income projects and small business activities. The Kuria 
work groups that I observed were characterized by significant tensions between 
individualistic and collectivistic sentiments. The modern groups seemed increasingly 
formalized compared to the festive work parties of the past, with a growing importance of 
orderly labor contributions and reciprocal exchanges. Their activities, however, were still 
often rationalized by “traditional” Kuria sentiments of cooperation and sharing. The groups 
thus displayed an interesting tension between the spirit of cooperation and individual 
advancement. 
Isiiri is a group with traditions that go far back in history, and it has retained many of 
its distinctive characteristics. Isiiri are traditionally work groups for uncircumcised youth and 
include unmarried girls and boys who usually work in the groups from their teens to early 
twenties.15 One of the main purposes of the group, besides economic activities, is socializing 
the young and instilling them with values of cooperation and peaceful conduct. It is also a 
setting to look for potential marriage partners; ideally, the groups have an equal number of 
male and female participants. The groups are known for their elaborate systems of fines and 
sanctions for misbehaving—with the harshest sanctions related to fighting and quarreling. 
The members of the group work in rotation in each others’ fields as well as organize regular 
public dance parties (litungu) where they perform, dance and sing. The parties are often 
attended by the whole village.16 Recently, many isiiri groups have adopted non-agricultural 
side activities, and may have a rotating credit arrangement.  
                                                 
15 Rwezaura highlights the flexibility of isiiri membership as follows: “Isiri team consists of between 
twenty and fifty members. It is formed from young people aged between fifteen and twenty years who form a 
local dancing club. Its members may be married or single, circumcised or otherwise” (1985: 22). 
16 Communal dance parties are very important functions of the isiiri that involves constant practice. 
Group members play traditional instruments that include a lyre-like string instrument iritungu (giving the dance 
event its name—litungu or ritungu), a smaller string instrument ekegogo, and a bagpipe ililandi. Public dance 
parties are big social events and popular among young and middle aged people. As a rule, there are more boys 
than girls attending Kuria dance parties, and frequently the girls choose their partners. The dance events are 
often accompanied by traditional songs and drama performances (Rodima 2008). 
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Isiiri groups have strictly regimented work days and activity schedules. The work day 
starts with blowing the horn (kirondo) on a nearby hilltop or termite’s nest early in the 
morning. After the morning meeting and a few hours of work, the group has their breakfast—
often liquid fingermillet porridge (busara). Many groups work until noontime. If the 
members attend school, they can schedule group activities for later in the day.17 All these 
activities, from organizing breakfast to interacting with the outsiders, are regulated through 
intricate by-laws and sanctions. The sanctions usually come in 
two forms—monetary fines and the more traditional method 
of strikes with a stick.  
The by-laws and sanctions carry some interesting 
regularities. First, sanctions involving corporal punishment are 
usually prescribed for more casual offenses or for one’s 
behavior in more “traditional” settings like the group dance 
parties, as opposed to economic activities. The most severely 
punished offenses invariably relate to fighting, quarreling, and 
carrying weapons like machetes, knives and firearms.  
Another category of dire offences relates to “taking out 
group secrets.” That is most likely a norm borrowed from another important traditional 
entity—the secret clan council of medicine men and dream prophets (inchama), where telling 
outsiders about the group activities constituted an action detrimental to the well-being of the 
entire clan. Fines also relate to wrongdoings like being late or producing sloppy work, 
disrupting group meetings, not taking part in group breakfasts, 
and monopolizing partners at dance parties. Income from fines 
was used for group celebrations and obtaining wedding gifts for 
group members. It is interesting that the system of sanctions 
reflected a growing conceptual separation between the social 
activities of organizing dance parties and dramas, and the 
economic activities of the group. 
Most isiiri groups have a clearly defined and complex organizational structure that 
combines offices, rules and positions borrowed both from the more traditional clan authority 
as well as recent administrative and political party structures.18 The chairman of the group is 
the central authority figure and official representative of the group, involved in the overall 
coordination of the group activities. The secretary is responsible for record keeping, and the 
treasurer for handling the group fund and keeping track of cash income. The executive leader 
organizes daily activities of the group as well as gives orders to group members. 
                                                 
17 Several groups that I observed organized village dance parties on Wednesdays (in some cases also 
several times per week) and work for outsiders for payment on Fridays and Saturdays. From Mondays to 
Thursdays, they rotated on group members’ fields. 
18 Some of the more frequent positions include the group chairman (Mwenyekiti), secretary (Katibu), 
executive leader (Hukuma Watari), judge (Hakimu), head messenger/announcer (Tarishi Mkuu), and assistant 
messenger/announcer (Tarishi Msaidji), senior councilor (Mzee Mshauri), and group treasurer (Mhazini). 
“The meaning of Isiiri is: 
To do things together, to be 
a strong man.” 
Kenyamanyori village  
“Isiiri is a place to get good 
wives, to see the nature of the 
girl—is she hard-working and 
respectful? Isiiri members can 
also advise these girls to 
outsiders for marriage.”    
Kenyamanyori village 
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The messenger/announcers are intermediaries between the chairman and group 
members and provide mediation in case of misunderstandings. They can also consult with the 
clan elders and/or the village government about group affairs if needed. The Judge stipulates 
and administers sanctions and fines, and the senior councilor has an advisory and ritualistic 
role in the group (much like the members of secret elders’ council of Kuria clans—“quiet 
people” or abakiri). It could be said that the office of the Messenger/Announcer paralleled 
the functions of the traditional “clan speaker” (omogambi) who mediated between the secret 
clan council and the wider community. 
The position of the judge resembled the function 
of the litongo (neighborhood clan council) head who 
dealt with adjudicating conflicts and grievances. The 
origin of the positions of the chairman, secretary, 
executive leader and treasurer, on the other hand, are 
more recent and derive from various organizational 
structures of the socialist and post-socialist era. That 
mixing of different structural templates led to a certain 
ambiguity and tension between the more indirect and 
consensus oriented authority patterns borrowed from 
Kuria clan units and the central authority oriented more 
recent elements. However, despite the hierarchical organizational structure of most isiiri, it 
should be noted that consensus-oriented decision making still dominated in many of the 
groups. There was room for negotiations and compromise in the disputes involving everyday 
communal activities, with the most serious sanctions served for instances of fighting and 
violence.  
Despite their strong formal hierarchy, isiiri groups also exhibited considerable 
flexibility in joining into larger networks or separating into smaller units for various 
purposes. The isiiri could join into a “federation”—omogabiri—for organizing the local 
dance parties, particularly larger events involving elaborate presentations of local drama and 
songs. Each participating isiiri still retained its separate membership, by-laws, group funds 
and labor rotation arrangements. In some cases, like the omogabiri that incorporated five 
different isiiri groups that I observed in Tarime highlands, they could manage jointly a group 
enterprise like a communal farm plot. These larger “umbrella” groups could also serve for 
the adjacent isiiri for solving disputes and planning future activities. An opposite 
phenomenon also existed—several larger isiiri regularly broke into smaller groups 
(ekebotoro) to better manage labor rotation in their members’ fields.  
Of all Kuria work groups, iriika is the most prevalent, but also the most casual and 
least structured formation. It combines its flexibility with a potential for amazing complexity. 
Traditionally convened for seasonal agricultural activities and rotating farm labor, it 
increasingly involves various non-agricultural projects and joint business initiatives, as well 
as diverse savings and credit arrangements. A typical iriika is a relatively small group of like-
minded peers (4–10 people on average) who are frequently of same age and gender, although 
mixed groups are growing in prevalence. Frequently the participants are members of the 
“It is not easy to form an 
isiiri; it is difficult to get 
girls–we always have to ask 
the parents’ permission for the 
girls to join. If young people 
can’t get an isiiri, they form 
an iriika.” 
Kemakorere village 
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neighborhood age set.19 As the most widespread of Kuria groups, it embodies the culturally 
important values of working with one’s peers in a casual arrangement. The focus is less on 
by-laws and sanctions and more on friendship and common 
values: “Iriika doesn’t have laws. It has just people who have 
united to help each other.” The groups are generally regulated by 
mutuality: “If you don’t come to work for me, I won’t go to work 
for you.” Iriika members in K. village in Tarime highlands 
rationalize their participation as follows: “The reason for working 
together is to help each other work quicker than one person could 
do it. The benefit is that nobody fails to finish an activity. Working together is difficult, that 
is why not all people work together. One has to wake up early, work for long hours. People 
are lazy.” 
A tendency toward greater formalization could be noted in many recent iriika, 
however. The groups have adopted various by-laws and fines, instituted hierarchical offices 
and tended to operate with more consistent memberships for longer periods of time. In many 
cases that formalization could be related to the diversification of the group activities like 
jointly operated enterprises (often non-agricultural in nature), communal farms, performing 
paid group labor for outsiders, and contribution chains or loan funds. Most iriika had also 
developed a group fund, comprised of joint income and fines. Nowadays, even the more 
casual iriika often revert to some form of formalized structure and a few by-laws and 
sanctions, particularly in case of larger memberships. Most of the informal groups are not 
registered with the village government.20  
Iriika, Tarime District:  
The members of the group are five men of ages twenty-four to thirty-one. It was 
started in 1997 when a group of friends and neighbors from two adjacent villages 
came together: “Nowadays there is a lack of cows and oxen, how can we get the work 
done? We need to start an iriika.” They started with ten members and five permanent 
members have remained; five others join in during the rainy season. The group has 
refused three people as potential members who were seen as quarrelsome: “A good 
member is the one who likes development.”  
The men rotate on each other’s fields from Monday to Friday on a rainy 
season, helping each other cultivate fingermillet, sweet potatoes, cassava, bananas 
and coffee. They have a small communal farm of banana trees: a group member 
                                                 
19 At the time of my fieldwork, the age and gender composition of the group exhibited a much wider 
fluctuation than conveyed in Rwezaura’s description from 1985: “A third example is the irika, which consists 
exclusively of men or women of about the same ages. The name, irika, is derived from an age grade also known 
as irika” (p. 22). 
20 At the time of my fieldwork, K. village had only two official groups. There were four isiiri and more 
than twenty iriika in the village, many of which were seasonal. 
“If you are in iriika, you are 
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volunteered a land plot for that purpose. The weekly banana harvest is taken to the 
market on bicycles, with the income divided between five members.  
 The group has a group fund, treasurer, and written by-laws. Fines include the 
following: coming late: Tsh 50; quarreling or fighting: Tsh 3,000 or member expelled 
from the group; not turning up to work: Tsh 1,000. Money from the fines is 
distributed between the group members. The group works for outsiders on tasks like 
hand plowing, weeding, and certain construction tasks. The usual payment is about 
5,000 per day for the group. Such selling of workdays can happen two–three times 
per month, more often during the rainy season.  
Group members point out that benefits of being in iriika include helping each 
other, and “they get money when they share work.” Several of the members have 
started cultivating new crops since they joined the iriika—
tomatoes, bananas or coffee: “A member can go, see that 
somebody has coffee, and he can learn how to plant it.” The 
members report that their income has increased since joining the 
group.  
They also point out that the numbers of iriika and other 
groups have increased in their community: “It is profitable to do 
work together. In the old times, there 
were fewer groups. People have now 
increased in numbers. Make more 
iriika’s. They know how to do it from 
their ancestors. Those who work alone, they have bad 
habits and are not well accepted in the community.” 
 A lack of oxen for plowing fields and the resulting 
need for a larger work force was frequently cited as 
important reasons for participating in a work group like 
iriika. Another often mentioned factor was the need for 
monetary income. Paid group work for outsiders was an important element of belonging to 
iriika particularly for young men. One of the reasons why many younger men participated in 
work groups like iriika could also have been their family composition—as women performed 
most of the agricultural work in Kuria society and many younger men had only one wife, the 
young husband was usually more intensively involved in agricultural work than men with 
several wives. As Rwezaura (1985: 30) notes, “His labor is necessary to produce sufficient 
grain to feed the family. Moreover, his wife may be pregnant or suckling the baby. It would 
be necessary for the husband to assist her and he is also likely to seek the help of work teams 
within the neighborhood. It is no wonder, therefore, that young husbands become active 
members of several work teams.” 
The members of the above group point out that the benefits of working in a group are 
twofold—the members help each other, but they also get money when they “share work.” 
The element of money profits is thereby carefully framed in the socially acceptable themes of 
“helping each other” and “sharing work.” In several cases however, once a member has 
“Maybe I have a banana plant. 
It is not doing well. I go to 
somebody in my group; I see 
a well organized shamba. 
Then I get better income as I 
learn.”  
“Now, with iriika’s, 
women can also 
cultivate maize, 
bananas, coffee—
because everyone needs 
money!!” 
Nyamwigura village 
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become wealthier through group work, they may choose to leave the group and take up an 
individual business: “Some people do iriika, produce more crops, buy a cow and some oxen. 
Then they leave. Sometimes they get more money, buy a business in town. Then they can use 
their income to hire an iriika or organize ikiginga (festive work party).” Iriika may therefore 
sometimes seem as an “intermediary” step towards greater wealth and individual 
accumulation; however, one’s group membership (either present or past) is also considered 
an important element in one’s future business activities (for a detailed discussion, see next 
section). 
An all-woman iriika is a relatively recent phenomenon in Kuria society—it was 
traditionally not usual for women from different kin groups and neighborhoods to work 
together in regular reciprocating work arrangements.21 With increasing mobility and the 
spread of money economy, diverse settings have emerged for women to find like-minded 
individuals for cooperation. The groups assist women in farm work as well as provide access 
to cash income, allowing women more independence particularly in polygynous households 
(see next section for more details). The groups also provide social support, advice and 
emergency assistance. Working in iriika groups enables women to cultivate “men’s crops” 
with more ease—including cash crops like maize, vegetables, bananas and coffee, and obtain 
information about new crop varieties and cultivation techniques.  
The following is a successful women’s iriika, active both in agriculture as well as 
handicrafts production. The women reported that adding a cash contribution chain motivated 
new members to join the group. This is one of only two groups in the village registered with 
the district government.  
Iriika, Women’s Group, Tarime District: 
The group started in 1996 with six members. After a while, a rotating cash 
contribution chain was added and the membership grew rapidly, currently numbering 
at fifteen. The group members engage in agricultural activities three times per week. 
Members rotate in each other’s fields, but also have a communal farm. For that, they 
use various available land plots of the group members. The communal farm is used 
for growing maize, beans, and sunflowers. Last season the 
group received Tsh 19,000 for maize harvest which was 
divided into three parts: 1/3 for the group fund, 1/3 was 
invested in agriculture, and for 1/3 they bought embroidery 
supplies. The group engages in embroidery and other local 
handicrafts, making mats and table covers. Group members 
buy the supplies together and jointly sell their products 
(monthly income from handicrafts can be between Tsh 
3,000—10,000). There is a group fund, which currently has Tsh 23,000. The member 
for whom they work contributes Tsh 100 to the group fund when they work on her 
                                                 
21 The traditional labor assistance teams that involved women like igituria had been loosely based mutual 
assistance networks centering on individual maternal houses, mostly based on kin affiliations, and were not 
working together regularly but were rather convened on emergency occasions or to finish a labor intensive task.  
“We use the group loans 
together with our 
families–for school fees, 
food, clothing; basic 
household needs.” 
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field outside regular rotation. The group fund is not for loans 
but can be used for emergency assistance for group 
members. The rotating cash contribution chain operates 
three times per month, when Tsh 1,000 is collected from 
each member, and one of the members collects the lump 
sum.  
 The group has a written constitution and by-laws. 
Poor participation can be a problem: if one fails to work 
with the group three times without a good reason, she can be 
expelled (one person has been asked to leave so far). They 
have a chairperson, secretary and treasurer, plus a 
supervisory committee of five people. The group has also received a government loan 
of Tsh 200,000 for agricultural activities, as it is registered with the district 
government.  
The women discuss that in the past, groups like theirs used to be bigger, about 
thirty people in average. Nowadays, the groups are smaller: seven, ten, fifteen people. 
They think that the reason is that agriculture is not the only possibility for income any 
more, and people don’t need very large groups for agricultural 
work. The workday has also shortened–in the past, people used 
to work on the field all day, now usually only during morning 
hours. 
Iriika is no longer only for younger people. The 
members of Iriika ya Wazee (“Iriika of the Elders”) of Tarime 
district are between forty-five and sixty years of age: 
“Nowadays, old people need to have iriika’s too, as the young 
are often leaving the village.” The members are mostly neighbors—one woman and three 
men—and the group was started to help each other with farm work, as their children were 
growing up and moving elsewhere. The group members help each other with agriculture and 
construction, working in regular rotation in the members’ households. They also work for 
outsiders for money payment when they have time (the fee is Tsh 1,500 per day for the 
group). They are planning to start a communal onion farm, and one group member has 
contributed a plot of half an acre. The group chairman Mzee Chacha was born in 1942. He 
can see the benefit of working with iriika: he has expanded his cassava and sweet potato plot 
since he joined the group, and the farm work is already finished for the season. According to 
Mzee Chacha, there are more iriika’s at the present—even in the past, iriika’s have been 
strong, but now there are more diverse activities and opportunities to benefit from group 
work. In his opinion, the iriika are more advanced nowadays.  
As seen above, iriika as the basic Kuria arrangement for regular collective work can 
take diverse forms and is increasingly popular not among young men only, but also women 
and the elderly. Another arrangement that is popular among young businesspeople, and is 
also frequently called iriika, is a regular cash contribution group, the loans from which are 
used to fund business or local market activities of the members. Typically, the latter includes 
buying fish from the coastal areas of Lake Victoria and re-selling in the local markets of 
“Nowadays, old people 
need iriika’s, too, as 
the young are often 
leaving the village.” 
Mogabiri village 
“Our village has a lot of 
work groups as we are 
close to Kenya and our 
oxen are frequently 
stolen–we have to form 
groups to help each other 
with farm work.” 
Nyamwigura village 
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Tarime highlands; buying, grinding and re-selling different grains, managing small retail 
stands, workshops for handicrafts, carpentry or brick making. Despite the lack of the rotating 
labor component, group members prefer to refer to themselves as iriika and not ikomiti (local 
savings/credit groups) because of a smaller size of the group, as well as younger age of the 
participants. In some cases, the members of such groups were jointly operating a business 
venture—a local eatery (hoteli), village retail store, or a farm cultivating fashionable quick-
growing cash crops for Serengeti tourist lodges. It was particularly in such arrangements that 
the possibilities for individual wealth accumulation of the group leaders and initiators were 
most pronounced, in some occasions contributing to a marked inequality between the group 
members. 
The popularity of iriika groups and other regularly convening work groups seems to 
have coincided with a decline in festive neighborhood work parties—igikinga (sometimes 
also called irisaga). As local people recall, these had been used widely during labor-intensive 
periods in the past. These festive work parties included kinsfolk, neighbors and friends, and 
people were offered food and beer. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, the igikinga 
have almost disappeared.22 According to local reports, iriika and isiiri groups have taken 
their place: people either participate in them or “hire” them to work in their fields. Villagers 
point out that it is better to work as part of iriika than ikiginga, as reciprocity in the 
occasional work parties is not granted. The growing uncertainty of whether one’s labor 
contribution to a work party would be reciprocated also places an increased burden on the 
host to provide enough food and drinks.23 Ikiginga still happen occasionally, usually for 
finishing a larger task within a short period, and regular work groups like iriika are 
increasingly involved in the work parties, in addition to individual participants. The decline 
of festive work parties may also reflect how local support networks have changed: from 
                                                 
22 Shipton (2007: 109) reports a similar decline in saga farm labor among Luo of Kenya, with locals 
attributing that to the fact that “the hastier, sloppier work of a festive work gathering is suboptimal for 
extracting the highest yields per unit of land, and the losses become more significant as rural crowding shrinks 
fields over time.” Some Luo also explain the decline in festive work parties with the increasing use of cash and 
a growing individualism. 
23 There is much of evidence on the rapidly rising costs of convening “festive” cooperative labor parties 
or “beer parties” also from elsewhere in Africa. Donham (1994) has described how the households of the elders 
and the more wealthy were able to attract more labor for dabo work parties in Ethiopia partly due to their ability 
to provide more beer, half of which was usually purchased from the market. Uchendu (1956) argues that the 
rising costs of hospitality have been an important cause in the demise of many traditional work groups in 
Tanzania. Worby (1995) has described how the provision of consumption goods for humwe labor parties in 
Zimbabwe has advanced from traditional beer to commercially bought bread and tea. The situation is further 
complicated by the fact that festive beer and food contributions usually don’t function as direct payment for 
work, but as an important social cohesion mechanism. Karp (1987) calls beer contributions “the vehicle through 
which cooperation is achieved,” and Gulliver (1971: 195) points out that drinking beer at a work party 
symbolized good neighborliness and trust, “the continuity both of planting and harvesting and of cooperative 
effort by the same body of neighbors.” 
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larger, diffuse, extended household mobilized ones to smaller and more regular, peer-
centered arrangements. 
Another informal group type that is currently widespread in Kuria communities is 
ikomiti. Ikomiti is the most recent formation among Kuria work groups, appearing only in the 
1980s and 1990s, and its rise was in many ways related to the increasing importance of 
money in Kuria economy. Ikomiti is a group of middle aged and older people, usually 
twenty-forty members (although some groups can be as large as eighty people), and is 
sometimes called “isiiri for the elderly,” implying that this was a place where married people 
of both genders could work together and socialize. Regular collaboration with one’s peers 
who are not related by kin is a relatively novel phenomenon among older people in Kuria 
communities. One of the most important functions of the ikomiti is a rotating contribution 
chain, although it may also engage in common agricultural activities or rotating farm labor. 
Contributions are frequently in cash but can also involve material goods like roofing 
material. The groups have by-laws and strict monitoring of contributions and defaults. 
Therefore, their structure was relatively highly formalized with 
memberships remaining consistent over time, although several ikomiti 
groups grew considerably over the years.  
Because of their formalized features and greater regularity, 
ikomiti differed from their “predecessors” that were based on loose 
networks of mutual support and mobilized irregularly for emergencies 
or celebrations. One of these predecessors was bunge (translated also 
as “parliament” in Kiswahili). With the spread of the money economy, 
bunge contribution parties became increasingly expensive, as they 
were accompanied by lavish feasts and alcohol consumption. Chacha 
Marwa, a local Ward Secretary, explains: 
“Bunge’s are not efficient in society any more. People waste 
their contributions on drinking, it can happen that they eat and drink more than they 
contribute at a bunge party. At a bunge party, they can slaughter a bull for Tsh 
100,000, drink lots of gongo [hard spirit] and end up spending up to Tsh 200,000 
overall. All the money is now spent on drinking.” 
With the rise of ikomiti, people were able to conduct their savings and lending 
activities in a more regular and less expensive environment. When ikomiti groups were first 
formed, they used to incorporate an element of lavish feasts and social gatherings similar to 
bunge. That was soon replaced by less formal socializing, with hosting households 
contributing cheaper food items like liquid porridge (busara). Bunge parties still have some 
importance in Kuria society, especially for causes that require big sums of money, but their 
role has changed with the rise of the ikomiti. Bunge’s have always functioned as links 
between people of different affiliations, uniting the members of different kin units and 
neighborhoods into wider networks of mutual help. Nowadays, bunge may unite several 
“modern” contribution groups (like ikomiti) that attend bunge parties and contribute to the 
common cause. 
“Because of the 
ikomiti, I was able to 
marry a wife, buy a 
land plot and build a 
house for our family. It 
also continues to fund 
my hoteli business 
[local eatery].” 
Kenyamanyori village 
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Ikomiti groups may arise through various mechanisms. Some of them have emerged 
as regular contribution chains between people who have participated in various ceremonial 
support networks in the past. Frequently, ikomiti have arisen from other work groups when 
the members have decided to add a savings/credit function, and more members have joined 
as a result. For example, a thirty-member ikomiti had developed in K. village of Tarime 
highlands from a beer-making group (machicha) that was started by five women four years 
prior.24 The following case study shows a similar gradual evolvement of a large savings 
group from an existing five-member work group over the years, a history quite typical to 
larger Kuria ikomiti. 
 
Ikomiti, Tarime District: 
The group has forty-eight people and they contribute twice per month—on the 
fifteenth of the month, Tsh 1,000, and on the thirtieth, Ths 
2,000. The group has three men and forty-five women—as one 
of the women says: “Men like drinks and therefore they can’t 
save.”  
The contribution group started in 1993 between five 
neighbors. The membership grew quickly as people saw it as a 
good means to obtain large items like cattle and building 
materials. At one point, there were seventy-two members. Several members were 
expelled for breaching the by-laws and not contributing regularly. The group has the 
following fines: for coming late, Tsh 100; failing to contribute, Tsh 500; quarreling 
and fighting, Tsh 200. The fines go to the group fund and are used for buying supplies 
but also for group celebrations.  
Although most of the members came from a single village, several are from 
other villages. The three men in the group also belong to other savings-credit 
committees in the village. One of them contributes Tsh 4,000 per month overall, and 
Marwa Magori says that he “saves” Tsh 10,500 per month in three different 
contribution groups! He reports that his son got recently married because of that 
money—he was able to buy the cattle needed for the bride-wealth.  
Despite their appearance as contribution chains, ikomiti members often work together 
on farm activities. That is done by means of the ekesangero—smaller groups of a few 
members of the same ikomiti who work together in members’ households. In the past, 
ekesangero was the most prevalent of Kuria work groups and part of larger kin- or 
neighborhood-based networks. By the time of my fieldwork, ekesangero groups were mostly 
operating as parts of larger work or contribution groups. Their changed position as 
components of regular larger work groups instead of kin-based loose mutual help networks 
                                                 
24 Nelson (1995) has described a somewhat similar case in Kenya, where a women’s ROSCA had evolved 
over two decades from an informal beer brewing group with a rotating loan arrangement into a registered credit 
association and finally into a successful land-buying cooperative society. 
“We have very few men in 
our group, because men like 
drinks and they can’t save.” 
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may be seen as evidence of the growing importance of peer-based 
solidarities in the previously descent oriented communities.  
Ekesangero groups were an important part of an eighty-
one-member savings group (ikomiti) that I observed in Tarime 
highlands. The group had started in 1985 with ten people. The 
group has two bi-weekly contribution cycles rotating at the same 
time in the amounts of Tsh 500 and 1,000. Many members belong 
to both cycles. Most of the group members are women; there are 
only four men in the group. Every other Sunday, the members 
gather in the household of the person whose turn it is to collect the contributions. This 
Sunday, the meeting takes place in Mama Werema’s place (one of the wives in a polygynous 
household, she lives away from her husband’s home village, sharing her household with her 
grown daughter and her children). Present is also her daughter who participates in the smaller 
cycle. Fifty-two group members are attending, densely packing Mama Werema’s courtyard. 
Several people unable to participate have sent their contributions through other group 
members. The meeting starts with drinking liquid fingermillet porridge (busara) that Mama 
Werema and her daughter have prepared, and the discussion of daily affairs. A few previous 
loan recipients tell the group how they have been spending the money—one bought 
mattresses for two of her children; the other had to pay for her son’s hospital fees. A few past 
due contributions and fines are talked about.  
Once the actual contribution starts, the group chairman announces every contribution 
and contributor that is recorded in the record book by the group secretary (the group has a 
series of neatly kept record books that go back for years). The money is placed in a big bowl 
on the table, overseen by the group treasurer. Mama Werema receives a lump sum of Tsh 
68,500 (about 70 USD). Her daughter gets Tsh 36,000 and is fined Tsh 500, as she has 
delayed a contribution in the past. That causes some arguing as she claims that she didn’t 
contribute for a group member who had failed her labor turn—that member hadn’t shown up 
when it was the turn of their ekesangero to work on the daughter’s fields. The chairman of 
the group argues, however, that although the smaller work group is part of the big 
contribution chain, the work day on a group member’s field does not translate into a 
monetary equivalent. The missing sum is deducted from the daughter’s loan payment. Mama 
Werema tells me that she will use most of the money she received that day to get a wife for 
her son—by adding two more cows to the few she had already put aside for the 
bridewealth.25 
 Belonging in a savings group boosts one’s authority in the community by 
demonstrating willingness for cooperation and sharing. Kuria savings groups (and other types 
                                                 
25 There is also evidence from other parts of Africa that income from novel credit sources like ROSCAs, 
microfinance loans and formal credit sources are used extensively to fund life-stage events like bridewealth 
payments and ritual celebrations. James (2012: 22) has described how the commercialization of bridewealth and 
the increasing reliance on consumer credit in South Africa often leads to the situation where loans obtained 
through formal channels like banks and credit agencies are used to fund longer term, more morally based 
exchanges, like those relating to marriage and bridewealth. 
“The benefits of being 
in a group: we help each 
other, and we get 
money when we share 
work.” 
Nyamwigura village 
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of work groups in the area) were characterized by a pronounced multiplication of functions, 
purposes, and ties of reciprocity. Belonging to several groups at a time was considered 
advantageous both economically and socially, often leading to an extreme diversification of 
memberships and obligations. As could be seen, that multiplication of memberships and 
debts could also lead to growing disagreements and a juggling of conflicting tasks and 
liabilities. Some villagers belonged to a savings group by a virtue of their occupational 
niche—the most widespread of these were rotating savings groups among market women. 
Contribution groups around specific economic activities could also arise among fisherman, 
farmers and traders of certain cash crops (frequently vegetables or cotton), or people trading 
in cattle.26 The novel Kuria contribution groups provided, particularly women, with new 
kinds of access to money and savings. By granting them access to larger sums of money, the 
savings groups encouraged women to develop individual business activities and gain more 
freedom from the growingly exploitative extended family work demands.  
 Gender and age-based variables are important in culturally differentiated processes of 
capital formation (Rowlands 1995). Gendered savings patterns were evident also in Kuria 
work and contribution groups. Women preferred belonging to larger savings-credit groups 
and used their loans more extensively for household expenses than men. Men participated in 
smaller savings groups that were mostly business investment oriented or preferred groups 
that shared rotating labor contributions. For men, belonging to several contribution groups 
simultaneously was often seen as a means to extend their political influence whereas women 
were more frequently motivated by economic needs. Differences in saving patterns could 
also be observed between age groups: older men often used the group loans to obtain 
additional wives and cattle, whereas younger men preferred investing in small businesses and 
education.  
 Gender and age differentials played an important role in shaping social attitudes about 
the value of money and socially appropriate modes of investment in the groups. It is also 
interesting to note that the Kuria work groups were defined not only based on their main 
activities and size, but frequently also by the age of the participants. For example, as 
described above, younger people sometimes insisted on calling their contribution chains 
“iriika,” although the groups lacked a cooperative work function, as the term “ikomiti” was 
mostly associated with the elderly. That was also true for the latter—the increasingly 
prevalent cooperative work groups among the more mature frequently referred to themselves 
as ikomiti, even if they lacked cash contribution chains. The groups thereby served as novel 
devices for identifying oneself with a particular age group—a principle that had been of 
central importance in traditional Kuria social organization. In practice, however, one could 
also notice a tendency towards groups with a mixed age and gender composition.  
Both the structural hierarchies of the groups as well as vocabularies used for 
cooperative activities combined traditional templates with newer concepts originating from 
different eras and diverse policy initiatives. For example, the term ikomiti derives from 
Swahili kamati (in itself a derivative of the English word “committee”), which was used to 
                                                 
26 According to the seasonal and activity cycles, some of the savings groups operated only seasonally, 
whereas others were permanent.  
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denote an authoritative administrative body in the socialist and post-socialist village—the 
Village Committee (Kamati ya vijiji). It is likely that the women used this term to add 
legitimacy to their growing autonomy, as well as draw parallels to men’s traditional secret 
council—inchama. The inchama council was founded on profound secrecy in regards to its 
specialized knowledge and activities. Secrecy was also paramount in women’s work and 
savings groups—many of the groups had by-laws prohibiting the members from disclosing 
the matters discussed at group meetings. Shielding the information about women’s economic 
activities and resources from their husbands and other relatives, women’s groups gained 
more loyalty and trust from their members. Several other ethnographic studies of rotating 
savings and credit associations27 in Africa have indicated that women’s savings clubs tend to 
exclude men from their membership (Nelson 1995; Niger-Thomas 1995). Nelson reports that 
in Kenya, women often claim that they do not allow men in their groups because men are 
corrupt and do not have the “true spirit of harambee” (working together). Similar sentiments 
were observed in Tanzania—the members of those Kuria ikomiti’s that were largely female 
sometimes claimed that “Men don’t know how to save,” or “Men don’t save, they use money 
for drinking and marrying more wives.”  
Comparative ethnographic evidence indicates also that in some cases ROSCA 
networks can substitute for family ties, potentially weakening or transforming marriages and 
family units (Ardener 1995). Ardener argues that through according their members economic 
insurance and emphasizing public sociability, the savings networks can enhance solidarity 
between their members. The elements of mutuality and creativity were also emphasized 
among Kuria, who talked about group contributions as “sharing money” or “helping each 
other in new ways.” Mama Ghati, a sixty-two-year old village woman and a savings group 
member, characterized the contemporary mutual help as follows: “Nowadays we have much 
more old time groups than in the past. Long time ago, work groups were used just for 
cultivation in the field. Large quantities of food and hard drinks were consumed; meetings 
became rowdy and expensive. It is much better nowadays when the groups have money 
contributions. People in the group help each other the same way they used to in the past, only 
now the help is through money.”  
It is evident that Kuria mutual help groups became viable mechanisms of mediating 
the requirements of the emerging money economy because of their reliance on culturally 
accepted patterns of group affiliation and reciprocity. Similar tendencies of contemporary 
work groups as integrating the local patterns of labor management with those of financial 
management have also been observed in other African societies. Bortei-Doku and Aryeetey 
(1995) point out that the susu groups (indigenous savings/credit groups) of Ghana were based 
on age-old traditions of pooling labor, food, utensils and farm implements for the mutual 
benefit of the members. Niger-Thomas (1995: 99) has characterized the local ROSCA’s 
(njangi) in Cameroon as a “monetized form of a traditional method of organizing cooperative 
labor, namely what may be called a rotating land clearing association”. As money entered the 
                                                 
27 ROSCA (Rotating Savings Credit Association) is defined as “an association formed upon a core of 
participants who make regular contributions to a fund which is given in whole or in part to each contributor in 
turn” (Ardener 1995: 1). 
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local economy, cash replaced food and beer in the rotating work groups, and with the rise of 
cash cropping, communal money pooling and lending functions emerged (Niger-Thomas 
1995: 99). The rotating savings association is thus functioning on a money basis, but its 
operational principle is frequently rooted in the reciprocal pooling of labor and other 
traditional exchanges in the local community.  
Mutual Help in Africa: Some Comparisons 
For a better understanding of the changing labor and money sharing arrangements among 
Kuria, it is helpful to consider comparative ethnographic evidence of the evolution of mutual 
help in Africa. Several earlier scholars have argued that cooperative labor would soon be a 
thing of the past. According to Erasmus (1956: 444), wage labor was rapidly replacing 
“older,” reciprocal forms of farm labor in all parts of the world: “Throughout the world the 
employment of wage labor is replacing or has already replaced older reciprocal forms of farm 
labor by which families in need of extra help either exchanged an equal number of day’s 
work with their neighbors or entertained work parties of neighbors with feasts and drinking 
bouts.” He viewed the alleged breakdown of unpaid or reciprocal labor as “one aspect of a 
larger process–the individualization of society” (Erasmus 1956: 444), arguing that the 
increasing use of money and diversification of labor in rural communities were leading to 
more “efficient” labor forms.  
 Uchendu (1970) has noted that the inevitable decline in cooperative labor was caused 
by increasing monetization and specialization, the high costs and low efficiency of 
cooperative labor parties, and the breakdown of customary sanctions. Such arguments about 
the decline of cooperative labor in the rapidly monetizing economies of Africa have largely 
concentrated on the exchange labor (“reciprocal labor”) and festive labor (“non-reciprocal 
labor”) dichotomy. These terms suggested by Erasmus in 1956 have in some cases resulted in 
excessive attention on assumed labor reciprocities (often viewed as incipient “contractual” 
elements) at the expense of other relevant variables. Moore (1975) and Swindell (1985) have 
produced a more nuanced treatment of the dichotomy, pointing out that the exchange labor 
groups with their small but permanent work arrangements between farmers of similar 
standing may indicate an egalitarian ethos. The festive work parties, on the other hand, may 
carry a potential to reinforce existing and new differentiations and become forms of capitalist 
labor mobilization, by allowing “the relatively wealthy taking advantage both of new 
external markets for agricultural products and the elements of moral obligation still attached 
to calls to attend festive parties … placing the poor on the slippery downwards slope of 
attending these work parties, failing in consequence to cultivate their own land properly, and 
thus being forced to attend more work parties to meet current consumption requirements” 
(Moore 1975: 275).  
While the assumed evolutionary trajectory of non-reciprocal–reciprocal–wage labor is 
therefore not universal, there is also growing evidence about cooperative labor arrangements 
as a recent development. Cooperative labor has emerged with recent cash crop cultivation in 
a number of African communities (Swindell 1985; Worby 1995; Geschiere 1995). Charsley 
(1976: 34) argues against seeing work groups as “entities “persisting” from an unchanging 
past, to be sharply distinguished from the new and the modern”. He describes the silika 
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cooperative labor arrangements of the Luyia of Kenya as a relatively recent phenomenon 
related to growing migration, new cash crops, and incorporating new and old loyalties 
(including traditional descent and clan ties as well as newer Christian congregations).  
Ethnographic reports of the groups reveal a mixing of various festive and exchange 
labor elements, as well as old and new ideas, norms and resources. Shipton (2010: 148) has 
described the use of older types of cooperative work arrangements for cultivating a new cash 
crop, tobacco, among the Kenyan Luo: “Luo farmers have also adapted old Luo forms of 
labor exchange, notably the rika (the small circle of neighbors who exchange labor in 
rotation), to new tasks, including tobacco baling.” Contemporary ganyu work groups among 
the Maka of Cameroon that are associated with a recent rise in cocoa cultivation, integrate an 
emphasis on personal ambition with customary egalitarian ideology (Geschiere 1995). The 
novel groups that began as exchange labor arrangements took on certain elements of festive 
work parties like lavish and time-consuming receptions. Although the groups employed 
money for payment and for “renting out” the turns to host labor parties, they were also 
embedded in the “older” ideological framework of reciprocity. Geschiere (1995: 506) 
contends that whereas the groups exhibited some older organizational traits, they were based 
on new ideas of collaboration and incorporated new forms of individualism.  
In a similar vein, Worby (1995) has described how novel agrarian commodity 
production in Zimbabwe had been accompanied by an “efflorescence” of cooperative labor 
forms (with these existing alongside with less frequent hired labor contracts). Various recent 
initiatives like resettlement and cash cropping had increased the need for non-kin networks of 
labor assistance, but even then there were limits to accumulation through festive labor parties 
(called humwe—“one-ness”). Traditional exchange labor arrangements (machangano) 
prevailed alongside humwe, moving from the kinship idiom towards more formal contracts. 
Hired labor arrangements (maricho) were also resorted to with intensified cotton production, 
paradoxically often involving kinsmen. Agricultural intensification therefore meant a rise in 
all these work arrangements, with most people still preferring cooperative work forms to 
hired labor (Worby 1995). 
The impact of work groups on wealth differentiation is also far from evident. Donham 
(1994) points out that the persistent attempts of some households in Maale, Ethiopia, to 
attract more cooperative labor had been politically rather than economically motivated. He 
also found no evidence of a structural growth of the households hosting festive work parties. 
Geschiere (1995: 516) indicates that the lavish festive element of the work groups of 
Cameroon counteracted the possibilities of wealth accumulation. Provisions of palm-wine 
and food became essential in the new work arrangements and ultimately restricted the rise of 
deeper inequalities. Even “renting out” group work days did not lead to local structural 
dependencies as poor farmers were using the money to extend their cash crop production. 
Work groups had advantages for all groups of farmers, partly because of fluctuating crop 
prices and marketing difficulties (Geschiere 1995: 516).  
Englund (1999) has described the “small scale cash labor contracts” that were on the 
rise among the peasants of Malawi, but their viability was restricted because of high cash 
payments. Englund points out that the contracts were motivated by culturally acceptable 
patterns of “sharing the wealth” and making visible the constitutive relationships of hosts and 
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laborers, and suggests that for the arrangements to benefit the hosts materially, a degree of 
“alienation” was needed, like labor hiring from outside the community. O’Laughlin (1973: 
261) reports that the novel cooperative labor arrangement among Mbum in Chad that had 
intensified with cash cropping and a decline in “millet beer parties” seemed like a “midpoint” 
between festive and exchange labor forms, with “a generalized expectation of labor return for 
which it would be very difficult to establish a cash equivalent”. Charsley (1976) points out 
that the silika labor arrangement of Luyia in Kenya also lacked the techniques to establish 
relationships between input costs and output values—the hosting party was expected to 
provide food and daily fees for the work group. Charsley noted that this “uneconomic 
institution” was a recent innovation and not isolated from the market economy, and argued 
that silika contributed to the overall economic achievement in the community and its 
collective work ethic. Den Ouden (1995) reports an unexpected and somewhat paradoxical 
mixing of old and new elements of labor reciprocation in his study of farm labor in Benin. 
Due to the erosion of trust and cooperation in extended families, labor relations between 
family members frequently involved elements of immediate reciprocation. Hired labor 
relations with strangers, on the other hand, were becoming more multi-stranded and 
permanent, often incorporating various share-cropping arrangements.  
Contemporary cooperative labor forms are driven by diverse objectives, including 
political allegiances, sentiments of solidarity, and psychological support (Green 1999; Pottier 
1988). Intensifying migration and a recent influx of newcomers are mentioned as variables 
giving rise to modern work groups (McAllister 1999; Worby 1995). Wider socioeconomic 
factors like agrarian policy reforms, changes in markets, environmental stresses and climate 
events have often been connected to transformations in the local forms of mutual help. It is 
evident that collective work groups continue to be relevant in the commercializing local 
economies of Africa, revealing an intermingling of exchange and festive labor elements, 
diverse patterns of reciprocities, and older and newer types of resources. The impacts of the 
collective activities on social leveling or differentiation also vary contextually. With rising 
costs of festive work parties, alternative types of cooperative arrangements emerge, still 
keeping in line with local norms and values.  
My research of the Kuria work groups demonstrated a similar mixing of customary 
and novel loyalties and normative frameworks, with kin based idioms of work mobilization 
mixing with newer organizational templates and solidarities. Evolutionary assumptions of 
collective labor that view cooperative work groups as remnants of an egalitarian past can 
have significant ideological and policy implications (see also Worby 1992). Narratives of 
traditional communal production have been used to justify many ill-conceived agrarian 
collectivization reforms. Such had also been the case with the Ujamaa Villagization policies 
in Tanzania, as described above. This highlights the need to situate contemporary collective 
work forms within the wider social dynamics of mutuality. 
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Passageways of Cooperation: The Individualistic and Relational Kuria Person 
The Moralities and Materialities of Kuria Personhood 
An understanding of Kuria relationality demands a look into the ways Kuria persons are 
constructed through public collective activities as well as the materialities of exchange. It is 
suggested that the culturally accepted patterns of “building a person” in Kuria society affect 
the forms of collective work and illuminate the dynamics of modern-day mutual help groups. 
Essentializing approaches to African personhood frequently view it as guided by ascriptive 
and communalistic values, in opposition to the Western “autonomous” selfhood (see also 
Carrithers and Collins 1985, and Comaroff and Comaroff 1999 for a critique). Paradoxically, 
in segmentary Kuria society, individualistic traits have been historically highly valued. 
Informal discussions and public opinion became the main tools for maintaining order in the 
non-centralized polity (Ruel 1959).  
 Kuria clans had a diffuse authority structure, with public order mostly shaped through 
informal discussions and public opinion.28 Besides clan and lower order descent segments, 
various cross-cutting categories like generation classes, age grades, and circumcision sets 
added to the fluidity of allegiances and structures of cooperation. They increased contacts 
between individuals from different localities and age groups, enforcing a cultural idiom of 
“extending oneself,” also expressed in Kuria rituals and cosmology. That concept of personal 
effectiveness in a historical context of diffuse solidarities was largely a function of Kuria 
relationships with others.29 
                                                 
28 Testifying to that “customary recognition of public opinion,” Tobisson (1986: 105) points out that even 
in the late 1970s, chaos often reigned whenever local state courts discussed Kuria cases, “since elderly members 
of the audience felt they had a right to comment on matters submitted to the court and even to argue with the 
judge about the correctness of the judicial decision.”  
29 This cultural principle of individual effectiveness through relational ties was also reflected in many 
aspects of Kuria public authority. The main authority structures that represented the clan as a political unit 
included the positions of the speaker or leader (omogambi), the dream-prophet or seer (omorooti), and the secret 
council (inchama or ikimiira). Ruel (1959) has described these traditional positions as not formalized but rather 
based on the individual powers of the position holders and their acceptance by the public. The clan speaker was 
neither appointed nor elected, but his status was achieved through “public recognition” (Ruel 1959: 43) and was 
dependent on his “personal qualities and effectiveness in leadership” (Ruel n.d.: 5). The dream-prophet, 
similarly, was seen to largely depend on the public approval for his status: “If the omogambi was the 
circumstantial leader of the country, the omorooti was its circumstantial prophet” (Ruel n.d.: 5). One of his 
main tasks was to give advice for future cattle raids of the clan, foretelling enemy movements. The position of 
the seer therefore was a function of a particular ability of an individual, compounded with his personal 
knowledge and judgment (Ruel 1991). It was accepted only through the support of the wider public and the 
elders of individual descent units. The public figures of authority were thus always dependent on a wider public 
acceptance of their messages, having to display the characteristics of extraordinary and gifted individuals. The 
prestige of these leaders was thus determined through their interaction with others. 
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The cultural principle of extending one’s influence over the outside environment was 
symbolically reflected in many facets of Kuria social organization, spatial symbolics, and 
rituals (Ruel 1997; 2000). The Kuria concept of a person focuses on linkages and 
interdependence expressed through a central theme of a passageway (omooyo) that leads to 
an opening (ogotora). Omooyo, translated as “throat” or “windpipe” through which life-
sustaining substances can pass, is a vessel of flow and movement, identified with the 
processes of becoming and underlining “openness” as a condition of life and continuity (Ruel 
1997). That dialectical relationship between an orderly inside and an unpredictable outside, 
indispensable for a person’s growth, could be interpreted as a metaphor of the interaction 
between the Kuria person and the wider social environment with its diffuse and 
circumstantial solidarities. The central ritual concern with “passage-ways, openings, linkages 
and transitions” (Ruel 1985: 119) refers to the continuation and ordering of life processes, 
with a purpose of achieving the state of “orderly growth” both for the individual and society. 
During my field experience, the concept of omooyo was used in everyday conversations to 
convey the ideas of life force, desire, or motivation. Frequently the concept was used to 
indicate “spiritual strength” that was required for some action—as for example working 
together in a cooperative group.  
The concept of omooyo therefore denotes the dimension of a radical relationality in 
Kuria social experience through which people extend their influence in their environment in 
the course of making a person. Mediation was an important element in the operation of this 
transactional pathway. Most Kuria rituals traditionally were mediated by “ritual elders” 
(abagaaka abasubi), also called persons who “have arrived” (ubuhiku). It was up to the ritual 
elders to mediate the outside sources of “fecundity” and purposefully order these to 
contribute to personal and social growth. Engaging both material and social dimensions was 
vital to proper growth. Through channeling the outside flows and shaping proper distinctions, 
omooyo constituted a conceptual template for mediating socially relevant conversions and 
recombinations. These have included cattle transactions as well as different types of labor 
exchanges. Cattle raiding contributed to the social prestige of a person, aided by recounting 
one’s “feats” at public gatherings in the form of self-praise songs (see also Heald 1997).  
Disputes involving cattle frequently escalated into violent incidents between different 
community groups, with violence seen as an integral part of making the Kuria person. Mutual 
help mobilization was another transactional area enabling a Kuria person to extend his or her 
influence and expand the mutability of exchange items. Historically, it had created a field of 
social ties that bonded together people from different territorial settlements, kin groups, and 
age sets. Collective work was intricately tied to making a person’s identity as well as to the 
renewal of social order at large. Ethnographic reports have indicated the centrality of work 
activities in the production of personhood in many other African cultures. Comaroff and 
Comaroff (1999: 12) have described work among the Tswana as all activities that “yielded 
value in the form of persons, things, and relations”; as an act of fabrication of value available 
only through a relationship of interdependence: “Work … was the positive, relational aspect 
of human social activity; of the making of self and others in the course of everyday life”. 
Both warfare and work provided important settings for extending a person in Kuria society.  
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Cattle have historically been a resource of enormous economic and social importance 
among the Kuria,30 and have also played a crucial role in mediating social bonds as well as 
relations of obligation and debt. Cattle transactions in the framework of Kuria kinship 
institutions as well as culturally important activities like cattle raiding illuminate important 
changes and continuities in Kuria relationality. Through the bridewealth institution 
(ikihingo), the continuity of the Kuria homestead was assured by establishing the alliance of 
the new wife and her children to her husband’s descent line. To highlight the irrevocable 
connection between cattle and Kuria marriage, Ruel (1959: 101) argued that the function of 
bridewealth was “on a metaphorical level similar to the function of a log of wood (umuhingo) 
used to close the corral gateway at night: … the bride and her future children are now kept 
there by the cattle paid to her kin.”  
Traditionally, bridewealth payment was completed in different installments over 
several years or decades.31 Bridewealth rates have fluctuated over the years, influenced by 
wider socioeconomic factors as well as changes in social networks and patterns of 
reciprocities. Until the rhinderpest epidemic of 1890s, the average rate had been about ten to 
fifteen heifers, but the bovine epidemic served to reduce that and substitute other means of 
payment like bride-service or payments in grain (Ruel 1959; Rwezaura 1985). The stocks 
recovered and bride-price rates gradually increased to thirty to thirty-five heads of cattle by 
the 1930s (remaining around that range for several decades). Rwezaura (1985: 59) has 
associated the growing preference for a lump sum payment partly with an increasing market 
penetration that led to novel means for obtaining cattle: “Cattle, which in pre-colonial times 
were circulating only among elders in a closed system of marital exchanges, could now be 
purchased by men who had acquired money through a variety of non-traditional economic 
activities.” The somewhat more individualized access to cattle also related to the gradual 
weakening of the traditional “extended credit system” under which cattle were lent to one’s 
relatives and neighbors and which had facilitated a redistribution of cattle wealth (Rwezaura 
1985: 81–82).32 It is also evident, however, that although cattle may have lost some of its 
integrative functions of serving as a primary means of alliance between larger social units, it 
continued defining culturally relevant ties and transactions, as illuminated below in the 
                                                 
30 Kjerland (1995: 65) claims that cattle have been intricately related to the concepts of bravery and 
warriorhood among Kuria and are inherent in constructing and preserving Kuria manhood: “Strength, ability to 
survive and stock and dependent on one another; stock is the medium by which strength is demonstrated.” 
31 For example, Ruel has outlined “the initial bridewealth,” or the cattle handed over to the wife’s family 
at the wedding ceremony; “contingent gifts” or circumstantial cattle payment to the in-laws over the coming 
years, particularly at the occasion of beer parties; and “cattle of the embers” that concluded the bridewealth 
payment at the husband’s and wife’s elderhood ceremony (isubo) years after (Ruel 1959, 102–103).  
32 Ruel (1959) has a more reserved view of the extent of the commercialization of the Kuria economy at 
that time, pointing out that the Kuria subsistence economy had not developed into a monetized activity, and the 
central role of cattle wealth remained relatively unchanged (see also Fleisher 2000: 58).  The influx of money to 
the local economy that Rwezaura is referring to originated mostly from casual labor in the mines, road works, 
and the state army.  
32     Daivi Rodima-Taylor 
 
contemporary transformations of woman-to-woman marriage and its relationships to mutual 
help.  
These changes in bridewealth payments paralleled similar transformations in the 
institution of cattle raiding. In precolonial times, cattle raiding usually occurred in relation to 
other tribes (Maasai in particular) or totemically unaffiliated Kuria clans (Fleisher 2000; Ruel 
1959). A relative growth in livestock numbers (despite the colonial destocking policies and 
bans on extensive bridewealth) and the development of cattle markets contributed to 
intensified cattle raiding in the colonial period (Kjerland 1995; Fleisher 2000). That period 
also witnessed an increasing migration from the congested highland areas to Tarime and 
Serengeti lowlands, intensifying competition for resources between different clans and 
descent segments. A steady decline in cattle numbers occurred after the 1950s, with 
bridewealth rates remaining high until about 1980s (Fleisher 2000). Related to the 
development of local and regional cattle markets as well as the influx of the firearms after the 
1978 Tanzania-Uganda War, cattle raiding had become a serious problem in several areas of 
Mara region by the 1980s and 90s, with important consequences to local peace and security. 
As Heald (2005: 268) has put it: “in the 1980s, Kuria had the manpower in the form of highly 
trained fighters; the means in the form of guns, and the motivation to pursue raiding on a new 
footing, which had its roots in the past but was equally shaped by the realities of the present”. 
The escalating cattle rustling and interclan warfare further contributed to the decline of cattle 
stocks and lower bridewealth rates.33 
Cattle continue to be recognized by Kuria as one of the most important kinds of 
wealth (oboome), seen as arising from social and material fecundity (oboronge). However, 
the ability of cattle to define social bonds has changed, together with its  relationship to 
collective action and its mobilization. Pressures on land and cattle resources have reduced the 
cohesion of clan, lineage, and family units: “Exactly when brother began to fight brother is 
uncertain, but this has become an increasingly more dominant feature. One informant spoke 
of the days when “brothers kill one another for land” as the end of every virtue and respect” 
(Kjerland 1995: 267). Some changes in the units of collective action had been reported 
already in the 1950s (partly resulting from the growing population densities and changing 
settlements patterns), with age and descent solidarities somewhat diminishing in favor of 
neighborhood based activities (see also Ruel 1959). These tendencies have been even more 
pronounced recently, reflected in the rise of neighborhood-based councils and courts with 
their armed vigilante units, as well as a proliferation of locally formed regular work groups 
that are increasingly replacing the loosely based mutual help networks of the past (Rodima 
2007).  
Cattle remain an important motivating and binding force in these novel formations. 
Declining cattle numbers was often given as a reason for forming a work group, reflected in 
statements like: “If you work with iriika, you are the same as the one with an ox-plough.” 
The lack of draught animals also motivated other farmers to hire work groups like iriika for 
plowing and land preparation. Such sentiments were particularly common among inhabitants 
                                                 
33 Fleisher (2000: 148), in his Nyaheiya village homestead survey, found that in the period 1986–1995, 
the bridewealth rate had declined approximately 40 percent or more. 
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of the communities close to the Kenyan border. An informant from N. village of Tarime 
district remarked, referring to the rampant cattle raiding: “Our village has a lot of work 
groups as we are close to Kenya and our oxen are frequently stolen—we have to form groups 
to help each other with farm work.” On the other hand, participation in work groups was 
often rationalized by the need to obtain cattle for bridewealth or other social purposes. 
Changes have also occurred in other important cultural savings patterns, particularly 
those affecting women’s collective activities. With a growing movement of men from cattle 
rearing to agriculture and their monopoly of local cash crops like bananas, maize, and coffee, 
women have been pushed into cultivating less nutritious and less marketable local crops like 
cassava and sweet potatoes (see also Bakema-Boon 1993). Women’s workloads in the 
extended family household have also increased. Kuria women are the principal agricultural 
producers particularly in polygynous household settings, performing most of the farm work 
for their own maternal houses as well as in the communal fields of the extended family. 
Harvest from the extended family fields has customarily functioned as a subsistence reserve 
for the whole household—stored in the homestead granary, emonko, and serving as 
subsistence aid for the wives and their children once their individual grain supplies have 
depleted.  
In recent decades, there has occurred an expansion of the emonko production, 
accompanied by its individual consumption by male household heads. Tobisson (1986) has 
shown that increasing commercialization of what once was a household subsistence reserve 
was already occurring in the 1970s, often leaving families vulnerable to hunger and 
malnutrition.34 The proceeds were used to obtain cattle (and thereby acquire new wives) as 
well as for men’s non-agricultural business projects. In fact, by the time of my own fieldwork 
a few decades later, the emonko reserve was locally known as “men’s granary.”  
Changes in the emonko savings mechanism have also affected women’s collective 
labor mobilization. It is significant that the emonko production in its traditional form was 
dependent on labor assistance by women’s work teams that were mobilized on the basis of 
individual maternal houses and consisted of kin and friends: “The work team gathered was 
one that the Kuria refer to as igituria, a term which designates ‘help’ or ‘love.’ Such a team 
can be called on by anyone in desperate need of assistance due to illness, the death of a 
family member during a peak season of work, or other serious problems.” (Tobisson 1986: 
185). Tobisson (1986: 195) describes the spreading reluctance of women to participate in 
such ad hoc work teams, particularly with the rapid expansion of emonko fields, as the fruits 
of that labor mostly benefitted men. By the time of my fieldwork over two decades later, the 
                                                 
34 The emonko harvest was often sold about six months before the new harvest, when the prices were at 
the highest. Another reason for that timing was cited as the ikiaro (clan) circumcision ceremony in September, 
making available a vast number of women eligible for marriage at that time of the year (Tobisson 1986: 189). 
Tobisson indicates that the emonko production was particularly vulnerable to being viewed as “marketable 
surplus” also because of the particular cultural recognition of maize (the main grain of emonko) as both food 
and cash crop. Even more importantly, there was no customary prohibition against the individual consumption 
of the subsistence reserve by the household head, leaving women and children increasingly vulnerable 
(Tobisson 1986: 190–92). 
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role of these large ad hoc work teams had further diminished in favor of smaller, more 
individually centered mutual labor arrangements that afforded women more flexibility and 
diversity of activity choice. Here as well, a decline in the more traditional loosely based and 
irregularly convened mutual assistance networks could be observed. That process facilitated 
the gradual emergence of smaller and more formalized collective work arrangements—
including iriika, ikomiti, and ekesangero groups.  
The Kuria matrimonial system with its complex gender dynamic is another cultural 
mechanism that is redefining the connections between women’s collective activities and 
cattle as a mediator of social exchanges. Kuria woman-to-woman marriage (omokamoona) in 
its various recent transformations is on the rise, providing women with novel spaces for 
collective action. This arrangement relies on the crucial role of cattle in mediating Kuria 
kinship bonds.  
Two types of cattle are differentiated based on their origin and social use. “Cattle of 
the daughters” are obtained through bridewealth payments. They belong to the house of the 
bride’s mother and could be used to acquire wives for her sons. “Cattle of the backbone” are 
obtained through work, trade, or cattle rustling and remain under the authority of male 
household heads. The “cattle of the daughters” that belong to the maternal houses is also the 
resource most often used for forging new social ties and attaching dependents. 
Bernhardsdotter (2001: 50) argues that the matrifocal principle of descent and inheritance 
rights assured Kuria married women “greater economic and social security than authoritarian 
patrilineal systems normally permit.” It also made it possible for senior women or widows to 
separate from their husband’s household and set up a “new lineage” through woman-to-
woman marriage. As the labor capacities of the daughter-in-law belong to her mother-in-
law’s house, the latter becomes an important mediator of bridewealth cattle as well as female 
labor. Building on the somewhat paradoxical characteristics of the Kuria kinship, (the 
considerable authority of matrifocal family units within the patrilineal extended family 
structure), omokamoona marriage provides the means for a sonless woman to continue her 
household by attaching daughters-in-law and their offspring to her house via bridewealth 
cattle.  
The omokamoona institution is quite recent, dating from the beginning of the 
twentieth century (Rwezaura 1985). Its relevance has grown with the increasing spread of the 
money economy, with women using cash to purchase bridewealth cattle and set up their own 
“extended families.”35 It can also serve as a means for divorced or separated women to set up 
a business enterprise, particularly in urban areas: “today the employment of daughters-in-law 
in the economic enterprise of rich business-women is a growing practice in Tarime district” 
(Rwezaura 1985: 157). Wealth accumulation through omokamoona marriage is not limited to 
separated or widowed women only, but can include younger married women and male 
household heads. According to Tobisson (1986: 173), the latter are often motivated to have 
one of their wives “marry” a wife for her non-existing son in a quest for extra labor power for 
                                                 
35 That tendency may have been partly related to decreasing cattle loans from relatives, leading to a need 
“to build up some economic security through cattle accumulation and the gathering of dependents through 
polygyny” (Rwezaura 1985: 156).  
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their household. Suggesting that the practice has become increasingly widespread in recent 
years, she notes “the growing need for female labour accompanying the increased market-
orientation of agricultural production” (Tobisson 1986: 177).36 Particularly in urban areas, 
the omokamoona arrangement is also known for giving rise to prostitution through the 
culturally “sanctioned” claims over the daughters-in-laws’ sexuality by their mothers-in-law. 
This is not the rule however, with many daughters-in-law legitimately engaged “in petty 
trade” and “as confident and industrious as their mothers-in-law” (Bernhardsdotter 2001: 
104). Bernhardsdotter contends that the omokamoona institution enabled the mothers-in-law 
entry to male spheres of power and status, as well as offered economic security and new 
freedoms to the daughters-in-law. Starace (2009: 51) claims that a similar institution of the 
neighboring Simbiti people (Nyumba Nthobu—“house without a man” in Kisimbiti) can 
facilitate wealth accumulation for the older women as well as new opportunities for the 
daughters-in-law, allowing the latter to “extricate” themselves from “irresponsible and 
violent men” of their previous relationships. While traditional in form and fraught with 
possibilities of inequality and exploitation, the arrangement was also used to cope with 
various contemporary issues: “[w]hile in the past, the Nyumba Nthobu was perceived as a 
forced marriage, nowadays it seems to be actively chosen by young women” (Starace 2009: 
143).  
It is evident that while allowing women more economic initiative, contemporary 
woman-to-woman marriage remains dependent on socially recognized ties and connections. 
As Rwezaura (1985: 158) claims: “in the course of seeking economic autonomy outside the 
traditional sphere these women needed the assistance of a number of people to whom they 
were attached by a recognized kinship bond.” Rather than viewing such novel kinship and 
associational ties as occurring between autonomous individuals, it is important to consider 
the entire field of relevant connections that frame these institutions in their contemporary 
variety. These historically diverse ways of expanding one’s personhood through culturally 
defined passageways for materiality also illuminate the dynamics of present-day Kuria 
mutual help institutions. It is suggested here that different types of mutual help groups acted 
as culturally accepted mediators with the outside, helping to integrate new kinds of resource 
flows that emerged with the expansion of the money economy.  
The growth and maturation of a person in Kuria society was a function of a constant 
reconfiguring of one’s personhood through mediated pathways with “the outside,” to access 
substances vital to that growth. Mediators like abagaaka abasubi fulfilled the role of a 
channel (omooyo) through which contact with the outside was effected, and their mediation 
authorized changes in the flows and transactions, indicating new directions and legitimizing 
the crossing of classificatory barriers. The value conversions that they facilitated added novel 
dimensions to both people and objects involved. Guyer (1995a; 2004) has suggested that 
conversions in the contexts of historically multiple sources of valuation should not be seen as 
exceptional transgressions of morally constructed barriers or ancient cultural premises. 
                                                 
36 In my own observations, this practice was particularly widespread in households where the elderly 
husband and wife (or wives) lacked male offspring and opted for the omokamoona arrangement to provide them 
with grandchildren to continue the house and lineage.  
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Rather, they constitute changes in the directionality of circulation pathways, with a potential 
to transform “the attributes of exchange goods in ways that define the social direction of 
future transactional possibilities” (2004: 30). The conversions taking place in the work 
groups mediated the building of a Kuria person through one’s regulated connectedness to 
people and material resources. That growth was not just accumulative, increasing one’s 
material and social wealth, but primarily a compositional process, in which transactions 
utilized and substances exchanged contributed qualitatively different dimensions to the 
transactors. The changing collective activities were not centered on facilitating individual 
accumulation in the contexts of a spreading money economy, but on novel modes of building 
a person in culturally accepted ways. 
Constructing Sovereignty through Relationality in Work Groups 
Cooperative labor mobilization had been a historically important mechanism for the self-
extension of the Kuria individual. Through work group participation, ties were created that 
were fluid and negotiable, determined by a person’s pursuits to assert his or her individuality 
and effect an impact on the social environment. Due to their symbolic power as mediators of 
conversions, work groups gained a central role in regulating the impacts of money in the 
newly commercializing environments. The activities of the groups determined socially 
acceptable conversions between money and labor, making mutable these different forms of 
value. They facilitated novel opportunities for advancement through the old idiom of 
“working together”—an instance of “conceptual stabilization” (Guyer 2004) whereby 
patterns and templates from existing institutional repertoires were used to incorporate new 
resources and types of transactions. That was reflected most clearly in the vocabulary used 
for group activities. These were mainly defined in terms of “sharing” (of different types of 
activities or money) rather than contracts, payments, debts or loans. Labor and money 
contributions that the group members received were called msaada ya iriika (the help of 
iriika). The word malipo (payment) was used to refer to the remuneration that the group 
received when working for outsiders but was never employed for labor contributions between 
the group members. Paid group work for outsiders was called kibarua—a Kiswahili word for 
casual or contractual wage labor.  
 In other settings, group members rarely used the abstract category of “work”.37 Many 
work groups described their activities with the word obwumi, which means “unity” or 
“togetherness” in Kikuria. Others referred to their act of joint labor by using the term for the 
group—for example iriika. The vocabularies therefore reflected little conceptual separation 
between the group as a unit and the act of working together.38 The terms iriika, originally 
                                                 
37 Godelier (1980) has suggested that the idea of “work” in general, as considered separate from its 
particular forms of manifestation, appeared only with capitalist production. 
38 Parkin (1979) has argued that local categorizations of work in Africa entail complex cultural 
valuations, indicating a religious and moral embeddedness of the concept. He points out that in Kenya, local 
moral evaluations of productive activities considered an element of control of an individual over her destiny: the 
notion “kazi” or work in Kiswahili was predominantly used for activities in a wage labor context.  
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referring to age solidarities, and obwumi, indicating unity or one-ness, seem to highlight the 
egalitarian, peer-oriented aspects of the collective activities.  
A multiplicity of different resources and work tasks were channeled through the 
activities of Kuria mutual aid groups. These included one-way labor contributions, reciprocal 
labor exchanges, transfers of food and drinks, agricultural products and farm implements, 
poultry and cattle. Cash exchanges and transfers mixed with other types of resource flows, 
resulting in innovative value conversions and a blurring of conceptual boundaries (Rodima 
2007). Cash contributions to the rotating loan fund were not just seen as economic 
investments; by the means of these, broader expectations of return were created. The 
expected returns included various forms of assistance in emergencies and ceremonial 
occasions. This extension of debt applied to the group as a whole, which became a “debt 
partner” to its members. That personification invested it with the power to authorize 
investments and activities that would have been socially less acceptable in different contexts, 
including various conversions between money and work.  
Work groups were also able to legitimize transfers of their members from one 
socioeconomic category to another through the idiom of “cooperation.” That was particularly 
important for poor women and youth who gained novel means to refashion their economic 
standing and social identities. Most of the local businesswomen had belonged to some sort of 
mutual aid group and many continued their group activities. Several women, as they gained 
the ability to collaborate with a wider array of exchange partners, became involved in 
informal lending services to their fellow villagers, further expanding their networks of 
influence. One’s identity as a cooperative group member was emphasized particularly in 
hierarchical and formal contexts (including interactions with local office holders and senior 
kin), whereas in informal settings, women’s conversations centered more on their activities 
as individual business owners or market traders.  
The Kuria concept of personal growth entails interacting with others in socially 
meaningful ways that often involve multiplying debt networks and accumulating potential 
exchange partners. A woman must show that she is a successful member of a mutual help 
group to gain the status of a businesswoman and the right to enter into transactions with the 
wider community. A person without a work group history lacks relevant constitutive 
relationships and she is not accorded the same social rights as others. A Kuria 
businesswoman therefore becomes socially recognized as having the attribute “independent” 
only through intensive participation in diverse networks and collectivities. A woman’s 
identity as a composite person is defined by the ties of obligation contained in that 
membership, and when interacting with an outsider, the material obligations extended are 
still affected by one’s group participation. By revealing her constitutive relationships as a 
work group member, her personhood becomes defined also through her relationship with her 
new trading partner. One’s present or past membership in mutual assistance networks 
increased a person’s powers of “successful persuasion” (Strathern 1992), enhancing her 
abilities to effect “extractions” from others through claim making and extending debt. In 
transactions that involved women who belonged to mutual assistance groups, their exchange 
partners interacted with different and more specialized sets of constitutive relationships than 
when dealing with women as belonging to their domestic and kin units only.  
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As relationality constituted a dominant social metaphor among Kuria, the Kuria 
person’s omooyo—a vessel mediating material and relationship flows—became a mechanism 
for creating new connections and freedoms in accordance with the changing environment. 
The Kuria work groups provided just another venue for forging and negotiating relationships, 
suited to the demands of the current historical moment of increasing commercialization and 
novel economic niches. Money economy affects the social construction of mutuality, but that 
occurs along the lines of particular aesthetic forms that facilitate the emerging connections 
and separations in social contexts that are defined by an underlying relationality.  
The material dimensions of the exchanges like cattle or maize transfers ensure the 
drawing of the distinctions in settings like these where social relations with their potential 
capacities rather than entities of a fixed nature are subject of interactions. The techniques for 
drawing difference therefore also define the processes of construing people and things as 
having value in people’s subjective regard (Strathern 1988: 176). The social templates 
involving a construction of mutualities through the attachment of various culturally defined 
procreative and productive capacities (including the contemporary forms of woman-to-
woman marriage and related modes of female cooperation) also shape the emerging 
collective dependencies and solidarities. 
The emergence of novel women’s collectivities like work groups and alternative 
“marriage” arrangements is partly a reflection of the increasingly diverse interactional 
contexts and resources available for them in the changing Tanzanian society. These 
expanding networks promise women new opportunities but also present more demands. In 
many cases, the groups served as stepping-stones towards greater economic security, 
especially for women from polygynous family settings with limited options.  
Some of these women used the new networks to establish themselves, in the absence 
of their husbands, as heads of their polygynous households, managing and supporting their 
co-wives. One’s social reputation as a businesswoman also expanded one’s network of 
activity partners and granted new freedoms. The activities of the groups therefore helped 
women to redefine their roles in the household and community and gain public visibility, 
introducing new gendered spaces of action. That led women to take over some roles and 
activities previously thought of as men’s domain—like becoming a successful 
businessperson or a head of an extended family household. At the same time, the expansion 
of a person’s interactional ties and networks also posed challenges, as it multiplied one’s 
obligations and debts. Participation in these collectivities therefore entailed constant 
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Cooperation in Peacekeeping: The Case of Kuria Vigilantes 
 
Alongside economic mutual help institutions, similar developments could be noted in 
informal forms of Kuria political authority. Administrative changes of different regimes had 
undermined circumstantial traditional authority structures, replacing these with highly 
formalized and fragmented ones. Local communities 
were further affected by the resettlements of the 
Villagization era, more recent economic migration to 
Serengeti lowlands, and the increasingly violent cattle 
raiding of 1980s–1990s. That period also witnessed a 
sharp rise in various informal institutions of social 
control in Kuria communities. The most important of 
these was a regular gathering of local clan 
representatives—litongo (iritongo) with its armed guards 
(walinzi wa jadi or “traditional guards,” often just 
referred to as jadi).39 These clan meetings dealt with 
adjudicating disputes and policing local communities, 
particularly active in the areas of cattle theft and stock disputes. In their ideal form, litongo 
were clan-based, although in practice, they seemed to incorporate increasingly diverse 
memberships and social units. As a local informant put it, “Litongo’s can be of different 
sizes. Litongo of the village, litongo of the 
division, litongo of all Kuria.” Most typically, a 
litongo included people from five to seven villages, 
most of them respected elders of a particular clan, 
but it could also be a meeting of clan 
representatives of just one village. The term was 
used quite loosely to indicate various different 
types of assemblies or meetings. Heald (2005: 274) 
noticed a similar tendency when studying 
vigilantism among Kuria: “Such iritongo … in 
Kuria may occur at any level; from that of a family 
cluster to that of the main political unit, the village, 
ward, or division in Tanzania; the sub-location or 
location in Kenya”. The litongo councils have their 
units of armed guards that execute their orders and 
often patrol the area at night to ward off cattle 
rustlers. These armed units can unite with other 
similar ones for larger operations in the neighborhood.  
                                                 
39 Similar vigilante units have been observed also among other ethnic groups in Tanzania; the most well-
known being the sungusungu’s of the neighboring Sukuma people that emerged in the 1980s to combat armed 
brigandage and cattle theft as well as growing witchcraft accusations (Abrahams and Bukurura 1993: 95). 
“Litongo is originally the part 
from where homestead is 
removed when shifting to a new 
place. The place where Kuria 
originated from is Litongo. That 
is their identity and unity.” 
Chacha M., Tarime highlands 
“Inchama is a collection of talented 
people—some are foretelling 
future, doing medicine healing, 
others deal with farming seasons 
and announce times to cultivate 
harvest, others know about crops. 
Yet others conduct celebrations and 
circumcisions. They work out rules 
and taboos, and engage in rituals to 
guard community welfare. The 
Inchama group has people 
specialized in different things.” 
Marwa M., Tarime highlands 
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 Although my local informants often referred to the litongo organization as essential to 
Kuria identity and social order, it was a relatively recent formation in its current form. 
According to local reports as well as some ethnographic evidence, litongo with their armed 
vigilante units did not emerge as important actors in wider community peace-keeping until 
the late 1980s. Heald (2005: 272) has associated their rise with violent cattle raiding and clan 
warfare of 1980s and the subsequent successful use of this “Kuria assembly” for the 
punishment of cattle thieves and confiscating firearms. It gained further momentum after the 
1995 mandate from the regional administration for local communities to codify their laws 
and punish wrong-doers (Heald 2005: 272).40 
At the time of my fieldwork, litongo with their armed jadi units had become 
ubiquitous in Kurialand, widely used for dealing with instances of theft and violence, but also 
for mediating quarrelsome neighbors and collecting fines.41 One of the main functions of the 
jadi was to reinforce cattle theft penalties.42 The Litongo and jadi are backed by a powerful 
traditional Kuria institution of social control—the secret clan council, inchama. In the past, 
these had been silent moral guardians of Kuria clans, performing secret rituals and 
prophesizing future events to ensure communal welfare. Rarely in direct contact with the 
people, they communicated mainly through clan spokesmen and tribal leaders. Nowadays, 
the role of inchama in mediating local disputes has become more pronounced. Many of them 
hold weekly meetings and are involved more intimately in daily matters and community 
                                                 
40 Contemporary Tanzanian informal peacekeeping units first emerged among neighboring Sukuma 
people in early 1980s. Abrahams (1989, 2008) has attributed the strong indigenous rise of Sukuma sungusungu 
to particular characteristics of the Sukuma dual polity. He points out that Sukuma society historically depended 
upon a negotiated equilibrium between informal neighborhood and village organization on the one hand, and 
the administrative structures of the Sukuma centralized chiefdom on the other. Traditional neighborhood 
threshing groups and informal courts also became loci of resistance to the state in the 1980s, leading to the rise 
of sungusungu vigilante groups (Abrahams 1989). When comparing Sukuma informal peacekeeping institutions 
to those of Kuria, Abrahams (2008) points out that the delayed emergence of vigilantism among the latter may 
be due to strong sectional divisions that have risen from the segmentary organization of Kuria society. Because 
of a relatively recent weakening of lineage and clan loyalties, neighborhood based informal peacekeeping 
groups among Kuria have emerged relatively later as compared to neighboring Sukuma.   
41 Jadi members commonly admitted that the biggest challenge was to make one admit to cattle theft, as 
well as get him to return the stolen stock. If the matter is discussed at a village assembly (baraza), the culprit 
may be handed over to the police by the village authorities. But that may often be the end of it, as witnesses to 
such crimes are difficult to find. 
42 Usually one had to replace the cow that he had stolen and contribute another one as penalty. It is not 
quite clear what happens with the “penalty cattle”—they can be shared between the owner of the stolen cow 
(victim in the case) and jadi members, or may just be taken by the members of jadi and litongo. The frequently 
told version is that the “penalty cows” go to the village Community Development Fund, but there is little 
evidence that this is the case. Several court cases that I examined in Tarime and Serengeti District Courts 
indicate that the penalty cattle is usually locally considered as “payment” to jadi members for their work, 
prompting the state judiciary to emphasize the “illegality” of such arrangements. There was evidence that this 
kind of payment system was also a recent development.  
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politics.43 In contrast to formal village authorities, inchama does not require witnesses—it 
has other, more effective means for solving disputes. The most important of these is the ritual 
of Kihore (egehore means “skull” in Kuria language)—a 
ritual poison-trial to clear one’s name and proclaim 
innocence. Mwita Elias of Tarime highlands describes it as 
follows: “At Inchama line crossing, the skull of somebody 
who has died is filled with traditional medicine. You cross 
the line [drawn with that medicine] if you are sure that you 
did not do that thing. If you did it and you cross—you die 
or your family will face death. Even if you did not do it, 
don’t cross, but say: please I did not do it but I will not 
cross, I will pay the fine. One is not encouraged to cross it. 
Many men are known to have gone crazy soon after taking 
the line crossing ritual.” 
The litongo routinely cooperate with the inchama if 
they are not able to solve a crime or theft case. They have 
considerable autonomy over their affairs, however, and collaborate also with other local 
authorities. In my experience, the collaboration was most frequent with lower administrative 
levels of the local government, including subvillage and village staff.44 Communication with 
higher levels like ward, division or district officials was 
somewhat more rare (Rodima 2007). One could also notice a 
contentious relationship between litongo and state police and 
judiciary. I observed numerous court cases and records at 
Tarime District Court and the regional Mwanza High Court 
that revealed a strong pattern of the decisions that were 
delivered and administered by litongo and jadi having been 
overturned once the matter reached the state court (Rodima 
2007: 304–14).  
Despite the efficacy of these informal institutions in 
curbing local theft and crime, state court officials were eager to point out that according to 
Tanzanian law, traditional institutions (like jadi and litongo—frequently called “clan 
assembly” in court records) were empowered to deal only with minor offenses and cannot 
                                                 
43 There is some evidence of similar developments involving “traditional” elders’ councils from 
elsewhere in Africa, like the “commoditization” of the elders’ expertise and their greater involvement in the 
politics of the Kenyan nation-state as described by McIntosh (2009). 
44 A sub-village (kitongoji) leader from Mogabiri village accounts that he often collaborates with litongo. 
In case of trouble in his subvillage, he presents the case or dispute to the litongo, who frequently forward it to 
Inchama. Litongo mostly deals with theft issues—“mambo ya wizi.” Kitongoji leaders try to investigate theft 
cases first on their own, and then present these to the litongo if the matter is not solved. Sometimes, especially if 
there are witnesses and the case is very clear-cut, they can present the case to the police instead. The theft cases 
of crops and cattle are usually dealt with through the help of litongo as they tend to involve little tangible 
evidence or witnesses. 
“One guy here died 
yesterday—he crossed the 
Kihore in 1994, but now 
stole a cow again. Such 
things happen frequently.” 
Inchama Secretary, Inchage 
division 
 
“We are also used for 
‘counseling,’ just like the High 
Court. Once a week, on 
Wednesdays—people come 
with problems, we have to 
mediate and make people unite. 
The main problems are cattle 
rustling, fighting, refusal to 
return borrowed things.” 
Inchama member, Ingwe division 
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deprive anybody of property. The following excerpt from a court record was fairly typical in 
that regard: “Any traditional council, be it Baraza la Jadi or clan assembly [litongo], is only 
empowered to deal with “minor offences of common assault, or other offenses of personal 
nature, or any minor civil dispute,” see section 99 of Penal Code, Constitutional Bill of 
Rights, Act 15/1984. No one can be deprived of property otherwise than through the court of 
law (Article 13/3).” The case record that overturns the decisions and cattle fines administered 
by the litongo ends with the judge claiming: “I think we are yet to trust having bulls in a 
China shop.”45  
Heald (2005) describes a similar ambiguous relationship with the state authorities in 
her study of Kuria vigilantes. Attributing the recent success of the litongo in community 
peacekeeping partly to the government mandates and collaboration, she points out that 
whereas that support came mostly from its political and administrative side, things were quite 
different with the judiciary. The informal peacekeeping units “directly undercut the very 
rationale of the official agents of law” (Heald 2005: 280). That also raises questions about the 
nature of state power in Africa in the context of increasingly pluralistic institutions and 
multiple sources of legitimacy (ibid.). Abrahams (1996, 2008) has similarly indicated that 
vigilante movements in Africa should not be seen in 
isolation from the state: “Rather than reject the 
state, vigilantism commonly thrives on the idea that 
the state’s legitimacy at any point in time depends 
on its ability to provide citizens with the levels of 
law and order they demand” (Abrahams 1996: 42). 
By defining state’s legitimacy through its 
contribution to a commonly imagined ideal state of 
affairs, vigilantes reaffirm its importance. As 
Herzfeld (1997) has pointed out, vigilantes 
simultaneously defy the state as well as justify its 
incursions, employing the same cultural icons 
utilized by the state to legitimize its interventions. 
This cultural model of “an ideal past” is a uniting 
bond between the state and the vigilantes, offering 
the latter evidence of “the condition of moral 
corruption that makes engagement with the state an 
acceptable, pragmatic accommodation” (Herzfeld 1997: 109), thereby justifying its partial 
acceptance of and cooperation with the formal authority. 
Such contentious but symbiotic relationship with state structures is characteristic to 
both economic as well as political self-help of the Kuria. Kuria vigilantes justify their actions 
through their association with the “traditional and clan-based” councils like litongo and 
inchama, presenting themselves as guardians of “clan self-reliance.” Through their rhetoric 
of traditional cooperation and self-reliance—so pervasively ingrained in the Tanzanian 
                                                 
45 Tarime District Court, Civil Case 8: Mwita vs. Msyoka, dismissed in Mwanza High Court, Nov. 15, 
1991.  
“Cattle rustling started only recently. 
Before that—there was stealing, not 
rustling. But now, people don’t 
steal—they come and say: ‘We have 
come to take your cattle.’ People are 
not together any more as litongo, as 
one. Now people are scattered, 
different cultures have contaminated 
society. The culture of any tribe is 
strong as long as it deals with one 
people. If it gets mixed, it gets weak.”  
Chacha M., Tarime highlands 
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collective memory of the socialist era—they evoke structural nostalgia for a Kuria mythical 
past where “pure” clan institutions and rituals safeguarded people’s prosperity and 
authenticity, unmarred by the polluting incursions of foreign ethnicities and customs—an 
idealized state of “unfettered self-regulation” (Herzfeld 1997: 110). The operation of the 
present-day “clan councils,” however, is deeply situated in the political realities of the 
increasingly heterogeneous, multiethnic villages. The secret clan council inchama has 
become less of a mystical guardian of the ritual than a practical institution of dispute 
adjudication, active in community politics. The group meets more frequently than in the past 
and has regular contacts with local people. Much of the veil of secrecy is gone, although the 
most important rituals are still performed in privacy. The clan assembly litongo has become 
more neighborhood based, providing flexible means for local negotiation and peacekeeping.  
Its recently formed organization of armed guards is frequently drawn upon also by local 
government authorities and the police.. The litongo in their present form combine the 
legitimacy that derives from their claimed association with “traditional” Kuria clans with 
their ability to successfully treat threats to social order in the increasingly complex 
environments of the local villages. Whereas the nature of traditional Kuria moral community 
could be exemplified in the secret clan council inchama as Ruel (1959) claimed, I find that 
the moral community of the present day finds its embodiment rather in the institution of 
litongo—an informal neighborhood meeting of flexible size and plural affiliation.  
Emerging Associational Spaces and Socialities 
The metaphors of familial sharing and working together have provided a common cultural 
idiom for diverse actors in post-colonial Tanzania. First coined by the socialist administration 
to consolidate a struggling post-colony of 120 different ethnic groups, they were used to 
legitimize forceful resettlement policies and replace local systems of political authority. The 
same metaphors also inspired popular resistance in the form of burgeoning self-help 
initiatives in the new villages. The neoliberal reforms of the 1980s provided further impetus 
for the rise of novel peer work groups and informal militia in Kuria communities. Helping to 
negotiate new norms of cooperation in uncertain times, the novel associations remained 
defined by the old idioms of familyhood and cooperation. It could be argued that the 
concepts of “sharing” and “working together” as used both in socialist state ideologies as 
well as in various local initiatives served to evoke “structural nostalgia”—“a collective 
representation of an Edenic order … in which the balanced perfection of social relations has 
not yet suffered the decay that affects everything human” (Herzfeld 1997: 109). The familial 
metaphors of communal activities seem to imply an imagined ideal of balanced reciprocity, 
indicating a need to restore mutuality that has been “ruptured by the self-interest of modern 
times” (Herzfeld 1997: 111). The use of such culturally iconic idioms may have contributed 
to the ability of the work groups to serve the interests of widely different purposes, 
motivations, and categories of individuals. While empowering poor women and youth, the 
groups could also facilitate individual accumulation and solidify the positions of wealthy 
businessmen and elders.  
 Mutual help groups have contributed to the integration of money and labor spheres 
and expanded money use among wider social categories—impacts seemingly at odds with 
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the proclaimed ideals of sharing and cooperation. The socialist ideologues of the Tanzanian 
state had coined the cultural icons of familial cooperation and self-reliance at the example of 
misinterpreted traditional mutual aid groups, purporting the idealized image of communal 
production as a quintessentially “African” way of life. Through the socialist rhetoric of the 
authoritarian state and its forceful Villagization policies, these concepts became reified and 
their connections to actual social practices obscured and hidden. But it was that static quality, 
“the very rigidity” of the outward form that encouraged strategic subversions by the social 
actors, providing them with an effective “mask with which to conceal a variety of messages” 
(Herzfeld 1997: 21) in furthering their agendas. At the same time, it also functioned as a 
powerful integrative mechanism between the local people and the state, facilitating their 
interaction as well as mutual defiance through the shared repertoire of cultural intimacy.  
What do the novel associational spaces imply for evolving moralities and public 
spaces in Tanzania? What is the wider systemic dynamic that these innovative collective 
arrangements facilitate? Green (2010) has argued that the role of the state has remained 
paramount in the transition to decentralized modes of governance in post-socialist Tanzania. 
She points out that the civil society organizations that are promoted by government programs 
and international NGOs in Tanzanian communities continue to be shaped by a long-standing 
focus in local governance on bureaucratic form, symbolic performance, and articulation 
between hierarchical layers. The emerging community based associations that are facilitated 
by various “good governance” initiatives translated from the global development discourse 
often lack a truly collective content and fail to provide an alternative public space between 
the family and the state (Green 2010). As Green is certainly right that most of the 
government and NGO-initiated local collective initiatives are set up along Western-
influenced bureaucratic templates, it could be inferred that such externally established 
collectivities lack an element of culturally recognized mutual help and reciprocity. In 
contrast, most of the contemporary Kuria informal groups were formed along the patterns of 
customary labor rotation as well as other socially meaningful exchanges and cultural 
metaphors of personal and social growth. Identifying and finding appropriate partnerships 
with these indigenous initiatives remains a challenge for both the state and the NGO sector in 
the ongoing transitions in Tanzania.  
The groups possessed a variety of novel elements, however, that referenced to the 
bureaucratic form of different socialist and post-socialist organizational structures. An 
interesting feature was also the prevalence of written group documents and by-laws, although 
most of the groups were not formally registered with the district government. Guyer (2004: 
155) has suggested that written documents are important expressions of the fixity of 
transactional terms, seeking to establish undisputed equivalences between different value 
scales and modes of measurement. In non-Western contexts, however, where the relational 
orientation of a transaction is important and gain is made by mediating the value scales 
through their directional orientation towards the past and future, the existence of written 
documents does not necessarily contribute to a systemic dynamic (Ibid.). That could also be 
observed in case of Kuria groups—the written documents and by-laws carried strong 
symbolic significance and served to legitimize the groups in the local political hierarchy, but 
there was also little formal recourse to reinforce the rules or sanctions. Most disputes were 
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solved within the groups or with the help of informal neighborhood clan councils, instead of 
involving formal judiciary, administrative officials or police. Peer pressure, negotiation and 
informal social sanctions were resorted to in case of a breach of group rules, despite long 
written lists of fines and sanctions for every conceivable offence. The written by-laws were 
subject to contestation and contextual interpretation, further highlighting the fragmented and 
partial nature of the formalized features of the work groups. 
That peculiar and often somewhat contradictory intermingling of elements and 
features of different eras and diverse organizational templates could also be an asset to the 
groups. As discussed above, the fluidity and potential for complexity that the mutual help 
groups exhibited enabled them to successfully integrate novel types of resources and 
categories of participants. This hybrid character that encouraged local innovation and 
creativity is typical to the spreading ‘popular economies’ that characterize the contexts of 
plural formalizations and partial institutionalization in African communities (see also Hull 
and James 2012). Facilitating and regulating both cooperation and negotiation of difference, 
the groups provided a welcoming venue for adaptive learning and experimentation. Gudeman 
(2001: 114) has suggested that communal contexts are important particularly for innovations 
that occur in the conditions of persistent instabilities, where innovation is constituted by a 
skillful manipulation of ‘human and material variability’ and other elements of 
unpredictability. Specialized groups in these contexts can be seen as a “production 
community” for joint mutual learning and experimenting (Ibid.). That certainly also 
characterizes the communal learning and innovation processes that occured in Kuria work 
groups. 
The diverse and experimental nature of the new informal associations and activities 
can also serve as an asset in the ongoing redefinitions of public moralities and occupational 
identities. Arguing that the fluidity of the African informal sector has not allowed the 
development of Western style civic moralities with uniform rules and professional codes, 
Bryceson (2010: 266) suggests more attention to the “transformative moral negotiations 
taking place in everyday life”. As new work codes and social alliances arise through 
negotiation and collective experimentation, the emerging moralities are contextually defined: 
“During occupational experimentation, moral influences on behavior will necessarily become 
more plural, open-ended and negotiable” (Bryceson 2010: 277). Instead of assuming a linear 
transition between the “moral economy” based collective activities and the Western-style 
“rights-based, self-governing” voluntary associations, it is relevant to concentrate on the 
patterns of trust and cooperation that emerge in the activities of diverse informal 
associational spaces and collectivities.  
According to my observations, regular activities of Kuria groups that concentrated 
around specific occupational areas and facilitated communication between peers had the 
potential to facilitate trust among the group members. Participation in various cooperative 
groups was particularly pronounced in the areas with higher degrees of in-migration and 
seasonal mobility such as the Serengeti lowlands, as well as in ethnically diverse places with 
an intermingling of different clans and ethnic groups. Dijkstra (2010: 62) observed similar 
tendencies in the “low-trust” communities of neighboring Kenya—in order to manage risk, 
local horticultural traders formed informal savings associations at local marketplaces that 
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frequently transcended “gender, ethnic and age divisions”. The trust created through joint 
activities, however, was based primarily on personal interaction and face-to-face ties 
(Dijkstra 2010: 62).46 Baehre (2007: 172) has described how the activities of financial self-
help groups among the Xhosa migrants of Cape Town resulted in “ambivalent social 
configurations” and “reluctant solidarity” in the turbulent environments of crime and social 
unrest. Instead of creating broader social cohesion, the groups effected “small bonds of 
ambivalence” among the residents of the townships (Baehre 2007: 173). Particularly in the 
contexts of social and economic instabilities, informal associations have an ambiguous 
potential to facilitate cooperation as well as conflict. As could be seen, the hypothetical 
values of social cohesion and collectivism had not given rise to Kuria mutual help groups, 
nor were they a product of their operation. While creating new contexts for collaboration and 
social support, the multiplication of diverse memberships and functions also had the potential 
to lead to conflicting obligations and competition over scarce resources. The Kuria concept 
of extending a person was a thoroughly relational one, its processual and immediate 
dimensions highlighted by the indexical conceptualization of personal and social growth in 
Kuria ritual. The Kuria work and savings groups therefore presented an interesting paradox 
of a growing organizational formalization of the groups within a setting of multiple ties of 
entrustment and obligation, intersecting affiliations and memberships, and a pronounced 
importance of relationality in regulating a complex web of debts.  
Kuria work and savings groups enabled their participants to advance their 
socioeconomic standing and extend themselves as persons in culturally accepted ways. The 
groups contributed to the “self-realization” of their members where a person was “recognized 
as dimensional in their own singular fashion” (Guyer 1993: 246). In a group setting, a 
woman of limited means could advance herself through activities that were culturally seen as 
“creating value” and could therefore contribute to her “pursuit of singularity” (Guyer 1993: 
255)—for example, participating in activities rationalized as “sharing” (of labor or money) 
instead of performing casual work for cash payment. The dynamic of wealth acquisition in 
the groups could therefore be seen not as accumulative but “compositional” (Guyer 2004): 
                                                 
46 Research on trust has shown that in order to foster cooperation in unstable or hostile environments, 
various existing bonds of association and familiarity may be extended in ritualized forms (Gambetta 1988). In 
order to seek and enhance such commonalities, new idioms of familiarity may be created in contexts that 
require regular cooperation in rapidly changing or transitional environments. Cohen (1969) has shown how 
Hausa migrants in Nigeria have manipulated their ethnic distinctiveness in order to enhance associational ties 
necessary to retain the monopoly over their long-distance trade in the conditions of constant relocation. 
Jacobson (1973) has demonstrated how professional townsmen in Uganda seek to create and perpetuate “idioms 
of continuity” that foster trust and interaction in the contexts of perpetual transience. Affiliations as diverse as 
kinship, ethnic or clan membership, social class, and the culture of friendship between social equals are used to 
forge these bonds. Trust between the itinerant townsmen has to be actively created and maintained, with people 
looking for commonalities and contexts of association that are most likely to fulfill their expectations. The 
language of friendship is therefore important for trust and associational activities in the context of high degree 
of uncertainty. Relying on a vocabulary used in affective or emotional contexts in the community, the idioms of 
friendship reflect new categories of peers and novel patterns of cooperation and social alliances.  
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the main goal was not a pursuit of material wealth through exploiting the labor of one’s 
peers, but rather an ongoing and relational process of extending one’s self through ties of 
interdependence. As the main focus of the Kuria ritual lay in bringing about an orderly 
change in the directionality of life-sustaining flows, Kuria work and saving groups could be 
seen as quasi-ritual settings, defined by their ability to effect socially relevant value 
conversions. That culturally accepted ritualistic element accorded them the power to integrate 
new types of resources and carve novel niches and gendered spaces. Providing invaluable 
contexts for a relational self-realization along the lines of the ancestral Kuria principle of 
“extending a person,” the groups emerged as novel passageways to facilitate the flows 
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